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Significant Statistics:
The Unwitting Policy Making of
Mathematically Ignorant Judges
Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SNAKE EYES AND THE POWER OF NUMBERS
III. RACIALIZED NUMBERS
IV. BIGOTED NUMBERS
V. RECLAIMING JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOCATING THE
RISK OF ERROR
VI. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
What could cause a judge to permit prosecutors to highlight the race of
criminal defendants when there is no indication that race is relevant to the
case?' Why would a court require a jury to consider a suspect as likely to be
guilty as innocent, even when there is no evidence other than an accusation?2
And what could possibly induce a judge to permit African-Americans and
women to receive lower damages than identically situated white men on the
unspoken expectation that racism and sexism will continue for the
foreseeable future? These, as well as other, perversions of justice are the
direct, though unthinking, result of judicial mathematical illiteracy.
* The authors are respectively Professor of Law and Piper & Marbury Faculty Fellow,
University of Baltimore School of Law; and Ph.D. candidate in Mathematics at the University of
California, Los Angeles; University of Cambridge, Certificate of Advanced Study in Mathematics
with Distinction, June 2005; Harvard University, Mathematics, B.A. 2004. We are grateful to
Robert H. Lande, Audrey McFarlane, and Max S. Oppenheimer for their insightful comments and
suggestions.
1. See infra notes 115-69 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 170-230 and accompanying text.
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The fact that many judges suffer from an "estrangement from, resistance
to, and incapacity in mathematics," should not be surprising.4 This
condition, after all, afflicts most lawyers, as it does most Americans.' One
need not conduct a study to know that "[l]aw students are typically smart
people who do not like math."6 Law professors are of little help to their
students, because "legal academics . .. tend not to have a background in, or
use, statistical analysis, or . . . are unfamiliar with empirical data
collection."7 Indeed, it is clear that there is a "prevalent (and disgraceful)
math-block that afflicts the legal profession."
Mathematical illiteracy is especially worrisome, as the analysis of
numbers has become such an important component of the legal system. In
particular, "the use of statistical testimony at trial has increased dramatically
during the past two decades."9 Statistical evidence is now an essential
element of cases spanning the legal universe. Statistics are regularly used to
prove or disprove issues as diverse as causation of injuries in toxic torts
cases, breach of contracts, discrimination in employment and voting, DNA
identification in criminal and family law, trademark and patent violations,
environmental harm, securities fraud, and loss of future earnings. 0
4. Peter A. Coclanis, History by the Numbers: Why Counting Matters, 7 MAG. HIST. 5, 8
(1992).
5. See generally MARILYN BURNS, MATH: FACING AN AMERICAN PHOBIA (1998).
6. Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1110, 1115
(1989).
7. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-first Century, 12 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 2 (2002); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1479 (1999) (stating "legal education itself (alas) 'produces no
improvement in the ability to apply the statistical and methodological rules of the probabilistic
sciences to either scientific studies or everyday-life events."' (quoting Darrin R. Lehman et al., The
Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life
Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 440 (1988))).
8. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Probity/Policy Distinction in the Statistical Evidence Debate, 66
TUL. L. REv. 141, 148-49 (1991) (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 778 (1987)). As Justice Breyer has
noted, "judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making
of such decisions." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
9. Koehler, supra note 8, at 141.; see also Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (stating "cases presenting significant science-related issues have increased in number");
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 97 (1990) ("Economic, statistical, technological, and
natural and social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both routine and complex
litigation.").
10. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FEDERAL JUSTICE
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 83, 85 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Kaye &
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics] ("Statistical assessments are prominent in many kinds of
cases, ranging from antitrust to voting rights. Statistical reasoning can be crucial to the
interpretation of psychological tests, toxicological and epidemiological studies, disparate treatment
of employees, and DNA fingerprinting; this list could easily be extended."); see also, e.g., Anderson
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005) (racial discrimination in
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The Supreme Court has declared that in all such cases, federal courts
have a "general 'gatekeeping' obligation."" Beginning with its 1993
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,12 the Court has
declared that the Federal Rules of Evidence "assign to the trial judge the task
of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and
is relevant to the task at hand." 3 Put bluntly, the Court has told judges that
they must ascertain the difference between "good science"l 4 and "junk
science."s
This evaluation appears to be a substantially more subtle task than that
formerly performed by federal judges. Under the previous regimen,
pursuant to the so-called Frye test, courts would admit statistical and other
technical evidence if it could be shown that such evidence was derived from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery which had "gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 6
employment); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005)
(breach of warranty claim); Currier v. United Techs. Corp., 393 F.3d 246 (1st Cir. 2004) (age
discrimination claim); Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110
(3d Cir. 2004) (trademark "reverse confusion" case); United States v. Blaine County, Montana, 363
F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (claiming that at-large election system diluted vote of Native Americans in
violation of the Voting Rights Act); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124 (9th
Cir. 2002) (causation in toxic tort personal injury case); Boncher ex rel Boncher v. Brown County,
272 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2001) (Due Process violated by lax prison security); Chavez v. Ill. State
Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (ethnic profiling in traffic stops); United States v. Wright, 215
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (DNA match of bank robber); Lehocky v. Tidel Techs., Inc., 220 F.R.D.
491 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (securities fraud); Everett v. Everett, 201 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1984) (paternity suit).
11. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7 (1993) (referring to the judge having "gatekeeping
responsibility"). Judges are to perform this gatekeeping function for testimony based on "scientific"
"technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141.
12. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13. Id. at 597. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
14. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). While twenty-five states (Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have expressly adopted
the Daubert standard or a similar test, at least fifteen states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington) and the District of Columbia continue to utilize the Frye
standard. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 454-55 (2008).
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The Supreme Court has explained that the Daubert test is less "rigid"
than Frye.'7  The Court stated that, without the exclusive emphasis on
"general acceptance," federal judges would be able "to admit a somewhat
broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under
Frye .... " Nonetheless, the Court has stressed that trial judges must still
screen evidence to determine its "scientific validity."' 9 According to the
Court, this inquiry is a "flexible" one.2 0 The Court also proposed several
factors that might "bear on" this examination.21 These factors include:
-Whether a "theory or technique . .. can be (and has been) tested";
-Whether it "has been subjected to peer review and publication";
-Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high
"known or potential rate of error" and whether there are "standards
controlling the technique's operation;" and
-Whether the theory or technique enjoys "general acceptance"
within a "relevant scientific community."22
Daubert's guidance has not provided much comfort for some judges
who have complained that they have been placed in the uncomfortable
position of evaluating the quality of scientific and statistical evidence far
beyond their own fields of expertise:
[T]hough we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match
for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our
responsibility to determine whether those experts' proposed
testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge," constitutes "good
science," and was "derived by the scientific method."
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise,
in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and
what is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert
testimony because it was not "derived by the scientific method."
17. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
18. Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 142.
19. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
20. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1999).
21. Id. at 149.
22. Id. at 149-50 (summarizing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we
take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.23
Such admirable humility might not be necessary were judges truly to
limit themselves to keeping out blatantly "junk science," such as "the
testimony of a phrenologist who would purport to prove a defendant's future
dangerousness based on the contours of the defendant's skull." 24 Similarly
easy evidence to exclude would be, as the Court explained, "theories
grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or
necromancy." 25
Even obviously bad mathematics should be readily observable to the
average judge. Consider the case of Boncher ex rel Boncher v. Brown
County.26 In the course of a lawsuit, alleging that a jail had been deliberately
indifferent to the risk of prisoner suicide, a criminologist testified that the
risk was "particularly acute" because there had been five suicides at the jail
during the previous five years. 27 But how "big" a risk does the number
"five" convey? As the court noted, the simple number "five" does not
disclose whether the risk was "acute" unless we also know the size of the
prison population, the rate of suicides in other prisons, and the rate of
suicides in the general geographic area from which the jail draws its
inmates. 28 After all, five suicides in a small prison population obviously
demonstrate a far greater level of risk than were that same number to occur
in a very large population. The criminologist's numeric evidence was
indeed "useless" and properly excluded under Daubert.29
On more subtle points of mathematics or science, it would be
appropriate for judges to turn to experts to help identify whether proposed
evidence is "good science." As the editors of the New England Journal of
Medicine suggested, "Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater
use of their inherent authority ... to appoint experts."30
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151. "Necromancy" is the "practice of supposedly
communicating with the spirits of the dead in order to predict the future." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004).
26. 272 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2001).
27. Id. at 486.
28. Id at 486-87.
29. Id at 486.
30. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
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But non-legal experts have been permitted to expand their role to the
point where they are now making normative policy decisions. Sometimes
this has happened when courts have confused scientific validity with logical
relevance; the science and mathematics may be undisputed, but the question
really involves the logical and legal connection of the numbers to the legal
point being proven. 1 At other times, courts have been unable to distinguish
the methods of the scientist and statistician from the values of their
disciplines. While those who use these methods must respect the
methodology of the disciplines from which they arise, we must also
recognize that the values of those disciplines often differ markedly from
those of the legal system.32 As the Carnegie Commission report, Science
and Technology in Judicial Decision Making, observed: "In the courts,
scientific knowledge must inform the choice, but abdication to the scientist
is incompatible with the judge's responsibility to decide the law." 3 In other
words, while striving to avoid accepting "junk science" into evidence, too
many judges have permitted statisticians and others to allow "junk law" into
the courts.
Many have assumed the problem is that judges "lacked the scientific
literacy" to evaluate evidence properly.34 Thus, there are complaints that
"[t]hose of a 'scientific' bent certainly can take issue with whether the
judges and lawyers have the education or training to engage in 'scientific'
testing . . . ."3 The critical judicial deficit, however, is not in science, but in
mathematics. Too many judges do not "speak math" and do not understand
what numbers communicate. They also fail to see that the meaning to be
given to mathematical results is frequently not a matter of scientific
necessity, but a reflection of specific value judgments. By ignoring those
judgments that are inherent in the mathematical choices, judges have
acquiesced to values that are at odds with our system of justice.
This Article will explore several areas in which judges, hampered by
their mathematical ignorance, have permitted numerical analysis to subvert
the goals of our legal system. In Part II, I will examine the perversion of the
presumption of innocence in paternity cases, where courts make the counter-
31. David H. Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA
Trawling Cases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 425, 431 (2009) [hereinafter Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual
Suspects]; see also infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 231-42 and accompanying text.
33. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES 27 (1993).
34. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey ofJudges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 433, 433 (2001); see also Paul
S. Miller et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientfic Literacy, 77 JUDICATURE 254, 254
(1994).
35. United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. 2002).
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factual assumption that regardless of the evidence, prior to DNA testing a
suspect has a fifty-fifty chance of being the father.36 In Part III, I will
explore the unnecessary injection of race into trials involving the statistics of
DNA matching, even when race is entirely irrelevant to the particular case.
Next, in Part IV, I will discuss how courts use race- and gender-based
statistics to reduce damages in tort cases for women and racial minorities,
and silently assert that past racism and sexism will continue. In the final
section, I will examine how judges have improperly allocated the risk of
error in cases such as securities fraud, so as to reward those who have
attempted to manipulate stock prices illegally.39
II. SNAKE EYES AND THE POWER OF NUMBERS
To understand both the uses and abuses of statistical evidence, I will
present a simple story, a murder mystery, called Snake Eyes.40 I will then
demonstrate the limits of pure statistical analysis and the way that courts
have permitted statisticians and scientists to warp the legal process and
pervert traditional legal values.
Snake Eyes
Victor is an elderly millionaire who has decided to bring his
family together to give away his possessions, which range in value
from one extremely rare antique to several mundane items. He
invites his eleven closest relatives to his house. He seats them at a
long table and tells them that they will be rolling dice to determine
the order in which they will select their respective gifts, with the
highest roll choosing first. Victor opens a fresh set of dice from the
Trustworthy Dice Company and hands them to his guests. Each
guest simultaneously places two dice in a dice cup, tosses the dice,
looks at the result, and covers their dice with the cup.
Sitting at one end of the table are Al and Dennis. Al,
immediately after looking at his dice, runs out of the house. All the
other guests race to the window to watch Al get into his car and
36. See infra notes 40-114 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 115-69 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 170-230 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 231-425 and accompanying text.
40. The term "snake eyes" refers to a roll of two dice which results in each die landing with one
spot face up. MICROSOFT ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1366 (2001).
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drive away. Suddenly, they hear a loud sound and turn around to
see Victor on the floor, bludgeoned to death with a candlestick. By
Victor's body is a note saying, "I killed him because I rolled snake
eyes."
The guests rush back to their seats and find that Victor's fall had
knocked all of the dice cups onto the floor, scattering all of the dice
except for Al's and Dennis's. Both dice cups are lifted, revealing
that each had rolled two "ones." Dennis concedes that indeed he
had rolled "snake eyes," but he denies having killed Victor.
Assuming the note was accurate, the dice were fair, and that there is no
other evidence, what can statistics tell us about the identity of the murderer?
Can it tell us how likely it is that Dennis is the murderer?
We can calculate easily the probability of Dennis rolling the murderer's
two "ones" if he were innocent. The probability that Dennis matched the
murderer's roll by pure random chance is one in thirty-six, which is about
2.8%.41 What that tells us is that Dennis's roll matched that of the murderer,
and the probability of a random match is 2.8%. Another way to think about
this is that if Dennis were not the murderer, the probability of seeing this
match is 2.8%.42
But that does not tell us what we want to know, which is the probability
that Dennis is the murderer. It is incorrect to say that: (1) Because the
probability of Dennis matching the murderer's snake eyes as a matter of
random chance was only 2.8%, then (2) The probability of Dennis not being
the murderer, given that match, is the same small 2.8%.
This error in sentence (2) is called the "prosecutor's fallacy" because it
incorrectly reverses events in a conditional probability to create a direct
statement about the defendant's probability of guilt that is not implied by the
evidence.43 In logical reasoning, such an error is called "transposing the
conditional."" It is the same mistake as saying: "Because lawyers tend to be
literate people, literate people tend to be lawyers."
To understand what other information is needed to calculate the
probability of guilt, we have to keep in mind that the likelihood of Dennis's
guilt depends in large measure on whether other people could have
41. The probability of obtaining a "six" on one die is one in six. Because each die's outcome is
independent of the other, the probability of obtaining a "six" on two dice is calculated by
multiplying the probability for obtaining a "six" on each: 1/6 x 1/6 = 1/36. HENRY E. KLUGH,
STATISTICS: THE ESSENTIALS FOR RESEARCH 152 (3d. ed. 1986).
42. Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REv. 949, 989 (2006).
43. See WOJTEK J. KRZANOWSKI, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES IN SCIENTIFIC AND
SOCIAL INVESTIGATIONS 18 (2007); see also William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J.
Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 850 (1996).
44. Park & Saks, supra note 42, at 988.
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committed the crime. If no one else in the room rolled snake eyes, then
there is no other suspect, and we can be 100% certain that Dennis is guilty.
If one other person in the room also rolled snake eyes, however, the
probability that Dennis is the murderer is fifty percent, because it would be
equally likely for either to be guilty.45 The key question, then, is not how
unlikely it was for Dennis to have rolled the telltale snake eyes, but how
many other people in the room also did.
Mathematically, that means we need to account for both the probability
that other people at the gathering rolled snake eyes and the probability that
Dennis was indeed the murderer despite the existence of others who matched
the evidence. In this story, there were ten people at the party who could
have committed the crime because Al was not in the house when the murder
happened. In such a case, the probability of Dennis's guilt is 88.4%.46 But,
if there were fewer suspects, say only five, the likelihood of finding other
suspects rolling snake eyes goes down, and the probability of Dennis's guilt
would increase to 94.6%. On the other hand, if there were many more
members of the family, say 100 other relatives in the room, there would then
be many more possible suspects, and the probability of Dennis's guilt would
drop to 33.8%. The probability of Dennis having rolled snake eyes has not
changed with each scenario, but the probability that he is the murderer-the
only issue we care about-has varied greatly depending on how many other
possible suspects there are.
It was not difficult to calculate the extent of this variation for these
examples because the number of other possible suspects was fixed and
known. One problem with applying this approach in the real world is that
we usually do not know how many other possible suspects there are. If a
murder occurs on a street in West Baltimore, the number of possible
suspects would turn, in part, on whether the universe of suspects includes
only those who live in the neighborhood, residents of the city, or all who
might conceivably have visited Baltimore that day.47 Each choice will lead
45. Mathematically, if n people rolled snake eyes, the probability of a given snake eyes roller
being the murderer is I/n.
46. The probability that a person rolling snake eyes is guilty can be expressed mathematically as:
N
Y [P((J - 1) other snake eyes rolls) x (1/J)]
J = I
with "N" equaling the total number of potential suspects and "J" equalling the differing number who
could have rolled snake eyes.
47. See generally The Wire (HBO television series 2002-2008).
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to a different probability that a particular suspect is guilty. Accordingly,
how we answer that unanswerable question will determine the result of any
statistical analysis. This dilemma has been called "the problem of reference
classes."A4
Resolving the ultimate question of the probability of a particular
suspect's guilt requires us to choose the particular population group with
which to compare our evidence. Unfortunately, there are "an infinite
number of reference classes, the boundary conditions of which can be
gerrymandered in countless ways .... [and] nothing in the natural world
privileges or picks out one of the classes as the right one . . . .'A To do the
math, we must choose the appropriate reference class, but we are then
making a subjective judgment not mandated by objective analysis.so
We face, therefore, one of the sad realities of statistics. The easiest
number to calculate-the probability that the defendant matches particular
evidence-does not give us the information we really want. Even if it were
very unlikely that the defendant matched particularly damning evidence, the
numbers would not tell us how likely it was that the evidence came from the
defendant.
We encounter this same problem when trying to determine paternity
using DNA. 5' The facts of the New Jersey case, State v. Spann,52 illustrate
the issue. In Spann, the defendant, a corrections officer at the county jail,
was charged with sexually assaulting an inmate.13  To prove that the
defendant had had sex with the victim, the prosecution wanted to prove that
the defendant was the father of the victim's child.54
Blood tests were entered into evidence." They showed that the child
had phenotypes A2, A28, B45, and B53. This corresponds to two genes,
48. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of
Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 109 (2007).
49. Id. at 112.
50. See, e.g., id. ( "[O]ur interests in the various inferences they generate pick out certain classes
as more or less relevant.").
51. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is a molecule that contains the genetic information for all
living things. David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in
FEDERAL JUSTICE CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 485, 487 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Kaye & Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence]. Most human DNA can be
found in our chromosomes. Id. at 491. A fertilized human egg has twenty-three pairs of
chromosomes, with each parent contributing half. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 60 (1996) [hereinafter NRC II]. Each chromosome
contains many thousands of genes, which are segments of DNA which have specific functions,
determining all the physical traits that we inherit from our biological parents. Kaye & Sensabaugh,
Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, supra at 492. Important traits are usually the product of the
relationship between many different genes. Id.
52. 617 A.2d 247 (N.J. 1993).
53. Id. at 248.
54. Id. at 249.
5 5. Id.
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located next to one another on the same chromosome.17  Of these four
phenotypes, a child receives two sets of A and B genes, one from the mother
and one from the father. The mother had HLA types A28, A30, B53, and
B61, which meant that the child's "A2, B45" set had to come from the
father. Thus, if a person did not have the A2 and B45 genes, that person
could not be the father. (Analogously, in the story Snake Eyes, if one guest,
Iris, had rolled two "fives", we would know that she was definitely not the
murderer.) Accordingly, a blood test can eliminate a suspect as a possible
father. As the Supreme Court has noted, "It is a negative rather than an
affirmative test with the potential to scientifically exclude the paternity of a
falsely accused putative father.""
Just as in Snake Eyes, where one could calculate the probability of
Dennis matching the murderer's snake eyes as a matter of random chance, it
is possible in Spann to calculate the probability of the defendant matching
the child's genes as a matter of random chance. Genetic tables showed that
only one percent of the relevant male population had the requisite blood and
tissue type. 59 But, as in Snake Eyes above, the fact that there is a small
probability that the defendant would match the child's genes as a matter of
random chance does not establish a similarly small probability that the
defendant was the actual source of the child's genes.
What that one percent figure does tell us is what is known as the
"probability of exclusion." 60  Ninety-nine percent of the relevant male
population can be excluded from suspicion.6 ' That still leaves one percent.
In a male population of 100,000, that would mean 1,000 people had not been
excluded. The probability of exclusion also cannot not tell us who among
those 1,000 is most likely to be the father.
56. Id. at 250 n. I. A "phenotype" has been defined as "[a] trait, such as eye color or blood
group, resulting from a genotype." Kaye & Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, supra
note 51, at 572.
57. Id.
58. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) (holding that to deny blood grouping tests in a
paternity suit because of defendant's lack of financial resources violated due process). In Spann, the
defendant's phenotype was A2, A28, B35, and B45. Spann, 617 A.2d at 250 n.l. Because he had
the A2 and B45 genes, he could not be excluded as the possible source of the child's genes.
59. Spann, 617 A.2d at 250 n.1.
60. Robert W. Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity Tests (But Were Afraid
To Ask), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 667, 680 (1982).
61. Spann, 617 A.2d at 250 n.1. Analogously, in Snake Eyes, the probability of exclusion (the
probability of rolling anything other than two "Is") was thirty-five in thirty-six, or approximately
97.2%.
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A statistic that is related to the probability of exclusion, which can also
be derived from blood tests, is called the Paternity Index (PI).62  The PI
compares the probability that the genetic makeup of the child could result
from the mating of the mother and a particular suspect with the probability
that it could result from the mating of the mother with some person
randomly selected from the general population. The less frequently a
particular genetic marker appears in the general population, the lower the
probability that a person chosen at random could be the father, and hence the
greater the P1.64
Note that the PI, like the probability of exclusion, still does not tell us
how likely it is that a particular suspect is the father. For example, consider
the following example drawn from a classic article by Professor David
Kaye.65
Assume that the probability a defendant in a paternity suit would
transmit the particular genes in question is 0.12, and that the probability for
a randomly selected man was 0.0062. The PI for the defendant would be
obtained by dividing his probability by that of the randomly selected man,
which would equal 19.4. A PI of 19.4 means that someone with the
defendant's exact genetic makeup would produce (with the mother) a child
with the requisite phenotype more than nineteen times as frequently as
would a randomly selected man.
Yet, we still do not know the probability that the defendant is the father.
If there were a relevant population of 100,000 men, we might expect that
approximately 620 men other than the defendant would also be capable of
transmitting the genes that created the child in question. Based on the PI,
that would mean that the probability that the defendant was the father was
only a miniscule 0.019%.66
In the real world, however, we cannot assume that, just because 620
people have the same matching genetic profile as the defendant, "everyone
62. ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING WITH DNA EVIDENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 75-77 (2007).
Sometimes, P1 refers to a single DNA marker. Id at 76-77. By multiplying the Pl for several
different markers, we can calculate a Combined Paternity Index (CPI), which is the value usually
entered into evidence. Id. Because courts typically, simply refer to the PI rather than CPI, see, e.g.,
Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App. 1998), I will use PI instead ofCPI in this Article.
63. SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 62, at 76.
64. The PI tends to be based on more genetic information than the probability of exclusion
because it incorporates not just the existence of particular genetic markers, but also the fact that men
with some sets of markers are more likely to transmit the particular genes than men with other sets.
D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Cases of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 75, 91 (1989).
65. See id at 89-94.
66. If all 100,000 men were seen as having the same opportunity to be the father as the
defendant, using Bayesean analysis, see infra notes 69-80, the prior odds would be I to 99,999, and
the posterior odds for the defendant's paternity would be 19.4 to 99,980.6, which equals
approximately 0.019%. See Kaye, supra note 64, at 94.
782
[Vol. 37: 771, 2010] Significant Statistics
PEPPERDINE LAw REVIEW
[is] equally likely to be guilty."67 This has been termed the "defendant's
fallacy"; it uses the numbers to make guilt appear unlikely while ignoring all
of the other evidence-such as how many people actually knew the mother,
how many of those ever had the opportunity to have sexual relations with
her at a time when she was able to conceive, and how many men were
infertile-all of which would exclude some people and render others more
plausible.
There is a mathematical solution to this problem, but it is one in which
the legal system's mathematical ignorance has led to a very disturbing trend.
The solution begins with a mathematical formula known as Bayes'
Theorem. 69 On its most basic level, the formula is nothing more than a
mathematical way of representing how we incorporate new information into
our reasoning: "When an observer receives new evidence relevant to the
truth of the proposition at issue, she adjusts her probability assessment to
take that evidence into account."70
For example, suppose a new restaurant opens and I read an excellent
review. I would think it is likely that this is a good restaurant. Then,
assume that a friend, whose tastes I trust, tells me she ate at the restaurant
and that the food was terrible. Obviously my assessment of the probability
that the restaurant is good will change with this new information. The
degree to which my assessment changes will depend on how much I value
the opinion of both the restaurant reviewer and my friend.
That reality is captured by Bayes' Theorem. To utilize this theorem, we
need to know that the Bayesian analysis of evidence relies on six concepts:
hypothesis, information, prior probability, likelihood, likelihood ratio, and
posterior probability.7'
A hypothesis could be thought of as a theory of the case; it is an answer
to the question "what happened?" There will always be a "main"
hypothesis, the theory being considered. In paternity litigation, the main
hypothesis is that the suspect is the father.
67. SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 62, at 116.
68. Id.
69. Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption ofInnocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN. L. REv. 873,
875 (2000) ("Bayes' Theorem posits that the posterior odds of the proposition equal the prior odds
times the likelihood ratio.").
70. Id. at 874-75.
71. See, e.g., Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects, supra note 31, at 463; Friedman, supra
note 69, at 875.
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Information refers to everything we know. Our aim is to determine the
probability that our main hypothesis is true after taking into account new
information.72 In the paternity case, the new information is the DNA match.
Before the new information is obtained, a hypothesis has a prior
probability of being true. Prior probability refers to the probability that a
particular hypothesis is true based on everything we knew before the arrival
of the new information.
Likelihood refers to the probability of having obtained the new
information under the assumption that a particular hypothesis is true.74 For
example, assuming the suspect is the father (our main hypothesis), what is
the probability he will match the DNA (our new evidence)? Because we
know that the father definitely matched the DNA, that probability is one.
Thus, we would say the likelihood is one.
To calculate the likelihood ratio, one must divide the likelihood by the
probability that the event would occur by random chance.76 The likelihood
ratio shows the effect the new evidence has on our hypothesis. As Richard
Friedman notes:
A likelihood ratio greater than 1 means that the proposition appears
more probable in light of the new evidence; a likelihood ratio less
than 1 means that the new evidence makes the proposition appear
less probable; and a likelihood ratio of precisely 1 means that the
new evidence leaves the probability unchanged.n
Finally we have our goal, the posterior probability, which is the
probability of our main hypothesis being true after we have obtained the new
information. (Note that this is the transposition of the likelihood.) The
posterior probability in a paternity suit is the probability that the suspect is
the father after we have the DNA match.
There are many different ways to express Bayes' Theorem. 79 For our
purposes, we can use the following:
72. Friedman, supra note 69, at 874-75.
73. Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects, supra note 31, at 463.
74. See id.at 464.
75. Id.
76. See Friedman, supra note 69, at 875.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Another way in which Bayes' Theorem is presented is:
P(A IB) = P(A) x PB
(P(B))
P(A) means the probability that event A would occur; P(B) means the probability that event B would
occur; P(AIB) means the probability of A given that B has occurred; and P(BIA) means the
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Posterior probability = Prior probability x Likelihood ratio ofhypothesis
Because the PI tells us the same information as the likelihood ratio, we
can write Bayes' formula for paternity litigation as:
Probability suspect = Prior probability x Paternity Index that the
suspect is the father
In other words, the probability that the defendant is the father, generally
known as the "probability of paternity,"80 equals the PI multiplied by the
prior probability of the defendant being the father. Because we have already
seen that the PI can be calculated readily, the only other issue is how to
calculate prior probability.
In simplistic cases, like the one described above in Snake Eyes, this
prior probability is not difficult to calculate. If there were ten guests, prior
to knowing the results of rolling the dice, each had an equal chance of being
the murderer so that the prior probability that Dennis, or any of the others,
was the murderer was one in ten, which equals ten percent. If we already
knew that Iris had rolled two "5s", she would be eliminated as a possibility,
and the prior probability that Dennis was the murderer would increase to one
in nine, or approximately 11.1%.
The real world, of course, is far messier. In the paternity context, for
example, the prior probability of the suspect being the father depends both
on whether he had sexual relations with the mother and on how many other
men she had sexual relations with, as well as the timing of each sexual
encounter. Those facts will rarely be known by the fact finder with any
degree of certainty, but instead will be conveyed by a wide range of
incomplete, uncertain, and often disputed pieces of evidence. Accordingly,
any determination of "prior probability"' will necessarily be based on the
subjective judgment of the fact finder. The prior probability that the suspect
is the father will be, in other words, an imprecise approximation, rather than
a nice, neat number. The problem that then arises is that Bayes' Theorem is
probability of B given that A has occurred. P(A[B) is therefore the transposition of P(B4); see also,
e.g., JEFF GILL, BAYESIAN METHODS: A SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES APPROACH 7 (2002)
("Bayes' law .... is really a device for 'inverting' conditional probabilities.").
80. Friedman, supra note 69, at 881 n.22.
81. See Kaye, supra note 31, at 465.
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no longer usable; one cannot do the calculation with only a subjective sense
of what might have happened.82
Without Bayes' formula, all that is left is the PI, which can tell us how
much of the population to exclude, but fails to answer the critical question of
how likely it is that the suspect is the father. There is nothing inherently
wrong with such a situation. In many trials, jurors are given information
that excludes large portions of the population, and must then figure out if the
defendant, who was not excluded, is the guilty party. For example, a jury
may be shown photographic evidence that the robber was a six-foot-six inch
Caucasian male. That would exclude all who do not meet that description,
but even if the defendant meets that description, the prosecutor would still
need to show more evidence (such as that the stolen goods were found in the
defendant's possession) to obtain a conviction.
The power of numbers and the promise of an objective determination,
however, have blinded many judges and legislators when it comes to
paternity testing. In courts throughout the country, the probability of
paternity is calculated using Bayes' Theorem by taking the PI and inserting
"a standard prior probability of .5 regardless of any other factors, which
indicates a fifty percent chance that the alleged father actually had sexual
intercourse with the mother.""
What the use of a prior probability of .5 means is that genetic experts
present to a jury the "probability of paternity" as a fixed number on the
unproven (and often unspoken) assumption that, prior to the genetic testing,
there was a fifty-fifty chance that the suspect was the father.8 Courts have
justified this use of a fictitious number on the dubious grounds that, "[t]he
50/50 assumption was completely neutral."85 This claim that this is a neutral
probability is based on the argument that "a prior probability of .5 assumes
that the defendant is just as not likely the father of the child as it assumes he
is the father."86
While fifty-fifty may appear fair at first glance, the fifty-fifty
assumption of prior probability is demonstrably not a neutral assumption.
To see why, let us return to Snake Eyes. 7 If Dennis had been accused of
82. For a discussion of the impossibility of turning subjective belief into a concrete number, see
infra text accompanying notes 102-05.
83. Butcher v. Kentucky, 96 S.W.3d 3, 7 (Ky. 2002).
84. See id.
85. Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
86. Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. App. 1998); see also Brown v. Smith, 526
S.E.2d 686, 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("A neutral assessment of the non-genetic evidence would
result in a prior probability of 0.5. This would give equal weight to paternity and non-paternity from
a non-genetic aspect."); Butcher, 96 S.W.3d at 9 ( "[A] .5 prior probability is neutral, neither
assuming nor denying that intercourse has taken place between the mother of the child and the
alleged father.").
87. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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being the murderer prior to the disclosure of his dice roll, it would have been
a tremendous injustice to assume that he was equally as likely to be the
murderer as not. There were, after all, nine other guests with an equal
chance of being guilty. Thus, a fifty-fifty assumption would be tantamount
to saying that Dennis was as likely to be the murderer as everyone else
combined. This is hardly a fair or accurate statement, as the odds of guilt
were not fifty-fifty, but actually nine-to-one.
One can also recognize this concept by looking at sports betting in
competitions with numerous contestants. For example, when there are sixty-
five teams in the NCAA Men's Basketball tournament, it would be ludicrous
to say that it is just as likely for one team to win as all the others, that the
odds are fifty-fifty. Indeed, for the 2008 tournament, even the favorite,
UCLA, was given odds by bookmakers of seven-to-two, while long shot
Coppin State was given odds of 2500-to-1." Similarly, at the 2008
Kentucky Derby, the heavy favorite and eventual winner, Big Brown, went
to the post with five-to-two odds in his race against nineteen other horses. 89
In these sporting venues, the reason that the prior probability of a
particular team or horse winning is not fifty-fifty is obvious. The choice is
not "Either A will win or A will not win." Rather, the choice is "Either A
will win, or B will win, or C will win, etc." Similarly, in the paternity
context, if all we have is an accusation, the choice is not "Either A is the
father or A is not the father," but "Either A is the father, or B is the father, or
C is the father, etc." In order for fifty-fifty to represent the actual prior odds
of paternity, there would have to be exactly one person other than the
suspect who had sexual relations with the mother during the appropriate time
span. To reject the use of the fifty-fifty prior probability is not to say that
there are endless groups of possible fathers in every case. Rather, it is to
assert the simple proposition that the automatic use of the fifty-fifty prior
probability is inappropriate because, without knowing other evidence, it is
impossible to know how many possible fathers there are. 90
88. Capperspicks.com, March Madness NCAA Tournament Betting Odds Available,
http://www.capperspicks.com/forums/online-sportsbook-casino-horse-racing-poker-industry-
news/I 515-march-madness-ncaa-tournament-betting-odds-available.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
89. Mark Blaudschun, Triumph, Tragedy at Derby, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4. 2008, at Cl.
90. Thus, the problem with the fifty-fifty probability is not that it operates "upon the assumption
'that the mother and putative father have engaged in sexual intercourse at least once during the
period of possible conception."' State v. Hartman, 426 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Wis. 1988), (quoting In re
Paternity of M.J.B., 425 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Wis. 1988)), revg 412 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. App. 1987).
Rather, as the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Spann, fifty-fifty odds
are wholly consistent with a fact pattern that one and only one man had access to and
intercourse with the victim and that one of two, and only two, men, including defendant,
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Another problem with the seemingly neutral assumption of fifty-fifty
prior probability is that it can easily lead to ridiculous, counter-factual
results. In Snake Eyes,9' for example, if we used the fifty-fifty prior
probability, we would conclude that Al, who was not in the house when the
shooting occurred, would be deemed to have the same likelihood of
committing the crime as Dennis. This leads to two perverse results: (a) two
different people are each given a probability of more than eighty percent of
being the only shooter; 92 and (b) someone who is definitely innocent is
perceived as far more likely to be guilty than innocent.
Lest one think this is a fanciful case, consider the plight of Donald
Cole. 93 A North Carolina district court judge found him to be the biological
father of Jonathan Cole, based on evidence showing that the probability of
patemity was 95.98%.94 The judge found that the numerical value for the
probability of paternity was more probative than the fact that the purported
father had had a vasectomy before Jonathan was born, and that tests showed
a sperm count of zero both before and after the birth.95 The finding of
paternity was reversed on appeal, but the lure of an easy number has
convinced all-too-many others to opt for counter-factual certainty.
Even while conceding that the assumption of a fifty-fifty prior
probability "will not correspond to the facts in most cases of disputed
paternity," the Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines recommended use of the fifty-
fifty assumption as a "useful working hypothesis."96 The Uniform Parentage
Act similarly creates a rebuttal presumption of paternity when there is a
probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent, "using a prior probability of
0.50."97 Many states have specifically adopted this language of the Uniform
Parentage Act, specifying use of "a prior probability of 0.50.",98 Among
could possibly have been that one man, neither one more likely than the other to be the
father.
State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 253 (N.J. 1993); see also Griffith, 976 S.W.2d at 248 ("Logically, the
prior probability assumes intercourse could have occurred and thus the putative father could be the
actual father, but the statistic does not necessarily assume intercourse did occur.").
91. See supra text accompanying note 40.
92. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
93. Cole v. Cole, 328 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 335 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. 1985).
94. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 449.
96. See Jack P. Abbott, Kenneth W. Sell & Harry D. Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines:
Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 262
(1976).
97. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 505(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2002). The presumption also requires
"a combined paternity index of at least 100 to I." Id. § 505(a)(2). Initially promulgated in 1973 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Uniform Parentage Act in its
current form is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.
98. Examples include: ALA. CODE § 26-17-505 (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7555 (West 2004);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-505 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 257.62 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.822
(2009); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532 (McKinney 2009), unconstitutional as applied by In re Adoption
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those states whose laws do not stipulate the fifty-fifty prior probability,
virtually every state still allows its use in creating a probability of
paternity."
Some have proposed that, rather than rely on a standard fifty-fifty prior
probability, a more accurate assessment can be made by having jurors
determine the prior probability for themselves. To assist with the
calculation, the jurors would be given a range of different prior probabilities
and the probability of paternity associated with each.'00  One court
stated,"[t]he expert should present calculations based on assumed prior
probabilities of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 percent."o
This proposal, though well-meaning, is hopelessly misguided. On the
most basic level, jurors are being asked to quantify the strengths of their
subjective opinions. The problem is that people generally cannot condense
their thoughts, feelings, and intuitions into a solid number.102 As Professor
J.H. Wigmore wrote, "no one has yet invented or discovered a mode of
measurement for the intensity of human belief."03
Even if opinions could be turned into numerical probabilities, justice
would not be served. A jury will have great difficulty balancing hard
numbers "against such fuzzy imponderables as the risk of frame-up or of
misobservation, if indeed it is not induced to ignore those imponderables
altogether." 04 The danger is that the attempt to concretize what is inherently
a subjective analysis will tend to "shift the focus away from such elements
as volition, knowledge, and intent, and toward such elements as identity and
occurrence-for the same reason that the hard variables tend to swamp the
soft." 05
of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-29 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 7700-505 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.505 (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-
505 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.420 (2010); and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-705 (2009).
99. See George Maha, Analysis of Genetic Test Results for Courtroom Use, in DISPUTED
PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 15.08 (Carl W. Gilmore ed., 2008).
100. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identication Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970). This was the approach used by the court in
State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 264-65 (N.J. 1993).
101. Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Or. 1987).
102. See Ira Mark Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilities and Proof Can HLA and Blood Group
Testing Prove Paternity? 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1153 (1979) ("[I]nstructing the jury to follow the
chart may be asking it to do something it cannot: to translate a subjective opinion about the non-test
evidence into a single probability figure.").
103. 9 J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497, at 325 (3d ed. 1940).
104. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1365 (1971).
105. Id. at 1366; see also Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The
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One court has rejected having jurors determine their own estimate of
prior probability because the resulting trial would be "unduly
complicated."' 06 Unfortunately, this same court barred the admission of the
factually-based "probability of exclusion" because jurors were "apt to
confuse" it with the simplified but inaccurate "likelihood of paternity."ov
Thus, in the name of simplicity, the court permitted the use of the inaccurate
fifty-fifty prior probability.
This may explain a large part of the reason the legal community has so
embraced the unfortunate use of fifty-fifty prior probability. In addition to
its seeming facial "neutrality," its use makes the intimidating math of Bayes'
Theorem easier to grasp and "more understandable." 08
To insist upon using the ersatz fifty-fifty probability because it is "more
understandable," though, presents "the absurdity of looking for the lost coin
under the lamppost solely because the light is better." 09 In the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the appeal of the precision of numbers is that they
"flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human
mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man."it0 It has long been understood by real mathematicians that "[f]ar
better an approximate answer to the right question, which is often vague,
than an exact answer to the wrong question... ." "
There is no disagreement about the mathematical accuracy of Bayes'
Theorem, the statistical meaning of the PI, or the fact that the generalized
use of the fifty-fifty prior probability is not necessitated by either science or
mathematics. However, it is a task for the legal system to determine whether
the use of a fixed fifty-fifty prior probability in order to determine the
likelihood of paternity provides an exact answer to the wrong question. It
Value of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1187, 1225 (1979) ("[A]ny conceptualization of reasonable
doubt in probabilistic form is inconsistent with the functional role the concept is designed to play.").
106. Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 490 N.E.2d 788, 797 n.19 (Mass. 1986). Among the
proposals rejected were presenting a chart to jurors showing the effect the blood test results would
have on a juror's own estimates of the prior odds of patemity, and providing jurors with a formula so
that they could see how their own estimate of prior probability would change the probability of
paternity calculation based on an assumed fifty percent prior probability. Id.; see also Ellman &
Kaye, supra note 102, at 1152-58; Peterson, supra note 60, at 686-89.
107. Beausoleil, 490 N.E.2d at 795; see also Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1987)
(stating that because of the possibility of confusion, the probability of exclusion should only be
admitted when it is in an "extreme range" (quoting Imms v. Clarke, 654 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983))).
108. Butcher v. Kentucky, 96 S.W.3d 3, 7, 9 (2002).
109. William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L'Oeil
or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REv. 49, 50 (1998). For a related lamppost metaphor, see
Allen & Pardo, supra note 48, at 119 (stating that a similar analysis was "reminiscent of relying on
the lamppost more for support than illumination").
110. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
111. John W. Tukey, The Future ofData Analysis, 33 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 1, 13-14
(1962).
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does not matter that "within the relevant community of blood testers, the
paternity probability calculations ... were based upon scientific methods,
accepted world-wide, which incorporate both Bayes' Theorem and the .5
prior probability." 1l2 The real issue is whether the use of an unsubstantiated,
counterfactual prior probability is relevant for deciding whether a particular
suspect is the father. Simply put, "[w]hat is and is not relevant is not
appropriately decided by scientists and statisticians.""' It is "for the trial
court, not the scientific community, to determine the relevance of the
technique."I14 If the numbers are not accurate, they are irrelevant and should
not be used.
But sometimes the numbers are accurate and still should not be used.
Such a situation arises with another DNA issue, this time the use of race in
describing genetic statistics.
III. RACIALIZED NUMBERS
Imagine that at Dennis's trial for the Snake Eyes murder, the prosecution
attempted to present evidence that, according to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, homicides are committed by one in 28,574 whites and one in
3,773 blacks."' Among the many objections to the admissibility of this
evidence would be that there is no reason to believe that race is relevant to
the question of Dennis's guilt and that bringing race unnecessarily before the
jury would imply that Dennis's race was somehow relevant.
It is astonishing, therefore, that such "race talk" is a commonplace
occurrence at criminal trials all over America. Even in cases where there is
112. Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d 936, 941 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); see also Brown v. Smith,
526 S.E.2d 686, 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("Most, if not all, laboratories in the United States use a
prior probability of 0.5 in calculating the genetic probability of paternity."); Griffith v. State, 976
S.W.2d 241, 245 n.2 (Tex. App. 1998) ("[Nearly a million paternity tests in the U.S. were
conducted using DNA or HLA methods, each using the .5 prior probability calculation."); M. v.
Marvin S., 656 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997) ("[T]he utilization by a laboratory of the 0.5
figure is a nationally accepted convention and that all the major laboratories use this figure for
paternity test reporting purposes.").
113. United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1025 (D.C. 2005); accord People v. Nelson, 185
P.3d 49, 65 (Cal. 2008), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 357 (2008).
114. Nelson, 185 P.3d at 65; see also Jenkins. 887 A.2d at 1024 ("This debate does not address the
underlying principles, math, or science behind the various formulas.. . . It is a disagreement over
relevance."). See generally Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects, supra note 31, at 448 (referring
to a "question .. . of logical relevance" as opposed to one of "general acceptance" or "scientific
validity").
115. These numbers are derived from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2010).
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no evidence of the perpetrator's race, jurors are often presented information
in explicitly racial terms, describing a DNA match between the defendant
and genetic material found at the crime scene. For example, in a typical
case, the prosecution's expert testified that "[d]efendant's genetic profile
would be expected to occur in one of 96 billion Caucasians, one of 180
billion Hispanics, and one of 340 billion African-Americans."' 16  Indeed,
when the race and ethnicity of the perpetrator is unknown, "providing
statistics from several racial groups is the standard way of assessing the
significance of a match ....
Those not well-versed in thinking about statistics can easily be
overwhelmed when told that scientists use racial categories to create such
extraordinarily intimidating numbers as "one of 340 billion African-
Americans." The impressiveness of those numbers, however, cannot be
permitted to prevent the legal system from making its own value judgment
about the significance of the fact that there are no actual definitions to
delineate the racial categories. The numbers should also not prevent judges
from recognizing the harm that results from permitting courtroom
discussions of race when race would otherwise be irrelevant.
Scientifically, the DNA analysis for a criminal match is similar, but not
identical, to that for paternity matching. In the latter, we are trying to see if
a suspect's DNA is consistent with that of whoever contributed half of the
child's DNA. In criminal matching, we are trying to determine whether two
DNA samples are identical.
When most people think about DNA, they focus on the many thousands
of genes, which are linked segments of DNA. Genes have specific functions
that determine all the physical traits that we inherit from our biological
parents."1 Genes, however, make up only a tiny percentage of our DNA.l 9
The vast majority of human DNA, estimated at ninety-seven percent, is
known as "non-coding" material or "junk DNA," because it serves no
known function. 120
116. People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864, 867 (Cal. 2006); see also, e.g., State v. Spann, 617 A.2d
247, 251 (N.J. 1993) ("The State's expert stated that the blood and tissue samples, combined with
statistical data reflecting the number of men with the relevant genes, excluded 99% of the North
American black male population as possible fathers.").
117. D. H. Kaye, Logical Relevance: Problems with the Reference Population and DNA Mixtures
in People v. Pizarro, 3 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 211, 214 (2004).
118. Usually, important traits are the product of the relationship between many different genes.
Kaye & Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, supra note 51, at 491.
119. NAT'L COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF
FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
12 (2000) [hereinafter FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING], available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183697.pdf.
120. Id.
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About 99.9% of DNA is identical between any two individuals.12 '
Differences in either genes or junk DNA are identified as "alleles." 22 A
position on a specific chromosome, called a "locus," where almost all
humans have the same DNA sequence, is termed "monomorphic." 23  A
locus with multiple possible alleles is termed "polymorphic." 24 The more
variations there are among alleles, the easier it is to make distinctions
between DNA samples.125  Because junk DNA tends to be highly
polymorphic, that is, it contains far greater variation among individuals, it is
used for forensic identification.' 26
What that means is that when an expert testifies about the likelihood of
DNA appearing in different racial groups, she is only referring to "non-
coding," or junk, DNA. Thus, she is not reporting on the DNA that
determines skin color or any other physical or biological characteristics
associated with specific races; the common assumption to the contrary is
completely, if not dangerously, misplaced.
While no single gene or collection of genetic material is specifically
associated with any one race, geneticists have determined that some non-
coded material is found in greater frequency in some population groups than
others. It is critical to recognize that not everyone in a particular ethnic or
racial group will have that same genetic material. Moreover, those in other
population groups may very well share that particular DNA. Thus, when
expert testimony is given about race and DNA, the expert is essentially
"making highly probabilistic statements about suspects and the likely ethnic,
racial, or cultural populations from which they can be identified-
statistically."' 27
121. Kaye & Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, supra note 51, at 491.
122. Id at 492.
123. Id at 492, 571.
124. Id. at 492.
125. See id. at 493.
126. See id at 492 n.25; see also DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No.
106-900(l),pt. 1, at 27 (2000), Pub. L. No.106-546, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2726 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13701) (stating that for privacy reasons, the non-coded regions "were purposely selected because
they are not associated with any known physical or medical characteristics").
127. Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, an Ever-Expanding DNA Forensic Database, and the Specter
of an Early-Twenty-First-Century Equivalent of Phrenology, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 314, 325 (David Lazer ed., 2004); see also State v. Spann,
617 A.2d 247, 251 n.3 (N.J. 1993) ("Since the incidence of different blood groups, as well as HLA
types, varies with race and to a lesser extent geography, gene-frequency tables are derived from
population studies of different racial groups.").
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Because of this statistical variation, "[t]he FBI's databases are divided
along racial lines."' 28 The FBI has divided its national DNA database into
five separate population groups: African-Americans, United States
Caucasians, Hispanics, Far East Asians, and Native Americans. 129 It is from
these FBI databases that courtroom experts derive the racial genetic
probabilities that they proclaim. But these probabilistic statements,
especially when presented with the mathematical certainty of "one of 340
billion African-Americans," mask a series of problems that can escape those
easily blinded by numbers.
First, there is the question of defining racial categories. If we are to
divide Americans in a scientific fashion into five population groups, we need
to have a working definition for each group. Obviously, if we are to
distinguish apples from oranges, we need to know the difference between
apples and oranges.
The demarcation between racial categories is especially important for
the national DNA database. The federal Combined DNA Identification
System (CODIS) is a three-tiered system.130  Local law enforcement
agencies collect the DNA data from those they arrest and create a Local
DNA Index System (LDIS).' 31 Each state then combines the local profiles
into a State DNA Index System (SDIS).13 2 Each of these state compilations
is then combined with the FBI's database into a National DNA Index
(NDIS), 133 which contains more than seven million "offender profiles." 34
Were only one entity to be charged with compiling and categorizing
individuals by race, a clear definition of the categories would be necessary.
But when thousands of individual local law enforcement agencies are
deciding who is "African-American," who is "Caucasian," and who is
"Hispanic," such clarity is essential.
128. People v. Dalcollo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
129. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF
STR MARKERS 282-83 (2d ed. 2005); cf Bruce Budowle et al., CODIS STR Loci Data from 41
Sample Populations, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 453, 453 (2001) (stating that in the United States, for
purposes of DNA analysis, African-American, U.S. Caucasian, Hispanics, Far East Asians, and
Native Americans make up the five "major population groups"). See generally Jonathan Kahn,
Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of Forensic DNA Evidence in Criminal
Trials (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathankahn/1.
130. Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in
America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 927 (2001).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 927-28.
133. Id. at 928.
134. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Services, CODIS-NDIS Statistics,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010); see also Erin Murphy, The
New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific
Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REv. 721, 739-40 (2007). The NDIS consists primarily of those who are
charged with, or have been convicted of, serious crimes including felonies and other crimes of
violence. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135a(d) (2006).
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Incredibly, there are no definitions of the particular racial categories that
are commonly used in courts throughout the nation. An FBI-funded report
by the National Research Council not only recommended the use of racial
categories135 but also admitted that there could be no uniform way of
delineating the categories:
There is no generally agreed-on vocabulary for treating human
diversity. Major groups are sometimes designated as races, and at
other times as ethnic groups. Ethnic group is also used to designate
subgroups of major groups.... [G]roups are mixed, all the
classifications are fuzzy at the borders, and the criteria for
membership are variable. For such reasons, some assert that the
word race is meaningless. But the word is commonly used and
generally understood, and we need a vocabulary.'36
In other words, despite the authoritative sound of the race-based genetic
statistical evidence, the actual classification system is no more precise,
consistent, or objective than Justice Stewart's notorious description of
obscenity: "I know it when I see it.",1 7  The way that race is "generally
understood" is entirely subjective and non-scientific, based on outward
appearance and the societal association of that appearance with a particular
racial label: "Even though we may feel confident of our visual perceptions
and racial or ethnic conclusions, we know that this kind of classification is
dismally inaccurate."
One difficulty with acknowledging this inaccuracy is that race is in our
nation's DNA. From the initial racialization of slavery, racial definitions
have been part of our national discourse.'39  But the actual placement of
135. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 315, 327
n.86 (2008).
136. NRC II, supra note 51, at 57-58 (emphasis added). This report was a follow-up to an earlier
FBI-funded report, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
(1992).
137. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The
full quote referred to the difficulty in defining what he termed "hard-core pornography":
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that.
138. Mildred K. Cho, Racial and Ethnic Categories in Biomedical Research: There Is No Baby in
the Bathwater, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 497, 498 (2006).
139. See, e.g., Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a
Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the Social Construction of
Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 22 (2005) ("The ideology [of race] arose as a rationalization and
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individuals in racial categories, even if "generally understood," has always
been imprecise. Ironically, at the same time the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson was upholding segregation as the inevitable result of "racial
instincts," the Court was also acknowledging that there was no agreed-upon
distinction between races: "[T]he proportion of colored blood necessary to
constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one
upon which there is a difference of opinion in the different States." 40
Today there is still no consensus on the meaning of race. When the
Oxford English Dictionary attempted to define "race," it recognized that "the
term is often used imprecisely; even among anthropologists there is no
generally accepted classification or terminology."l 4 1 Moreover, despite our
common usage, racial categories are not "discrete." 42  There is no bright
line separating the categories. Unlike with fish or fowl, racial categories are
not "mutually exclusive." 43
Still, if, as the National Research Council noted, race is "commonly
used," how are we able to categorize individuals by race? Many have
argued that race is "socially constructed," meaning that race is not innate and
unchanging.'" People look at the external physical traits, especially skin
color, and associate them with a particular race. These categories, however,
are "socially fluid": "For example, in the US, people with ancestry from
India are sometimes labeled Asian and sometimes labeled white or
'Caucasian'; they are not classified in the same way in the UK as in the
us." 45
justification for human slavery at a time when Western European societies were embracing
philosophies promoting individual and human rights, liberty, democracy, justice, brotherhood, and
equality.").
140. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). Homer Plessy was described as "seven
eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood." Id. at 541. See Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) ("In the middle years of the 19th century, dictionaries
commonly referred to race as a 'continued series of descendants from a parent who is called the
stock,' 'the lineage of a family,' or 'descendants of a common ancestor,' [and] [ilt was not until the
20th century that dictionaries began referring to the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races, or to
race as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics.") (citations
omitted).
141. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 (2d ed. 1989).
142. Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 113 (1994)
[hereinafter Chamallas, Questioning the Use] ("In a multi-racial society, such as the United States,
people do not fall naturally into discrete racial groupings.").
143. Duster, supra note 127, at 325.
144. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine,
39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 394 (2004).
145. Mildred K. Cho & Pamela Sankar, Forensic Genetics and Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications Beyond the Clinic, 36 NATURE GENETICS SUPPLEMENT at S8, S9 (2004), available at
http://backintyme.com/admixture/cho01.pdf.
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Not only will racial labels vary by geography, they can also vary by
time. It is not at all clear that Homer Plessy, who was generally considered
to "look White" would be considered African-American today. Indeed,
people may even change how they self-identify, altering the racial group to
which they say they belong. 14 6
The "incoherence" of race as a category is not contradicted by the fact
that there is some statistical correlation between the frequency of certain
alleles and our ill-defined racial categories. 147  What the DNA variations
actually are correlated to is, at best, a partial ancestral geographic origin.148
In other words, the DNA statistics might signal where some of one's
ancestors originated.
But even to the extent that geography is in our genes, the five racial
categories of CODIS cannot capture the reality of America. Unlike ancient,
insular societies, Americans do not stay isolated in neatly-definable
groupings: "After hundreds of years of sexual mixings, there continues to be
'no socially sanctioned in-between classification' of 'race' in America."l 49
Accordingly, the correlation of DNA and geography confirms the
incoherence of the CODIS statistical analysis, "the reality being that the
diversity of human biology has little in common with socially constructed
'racial' categories." 5 o
Thus, the introduction of racially-based DNA numbers into a courtroom
proceeding is fundamentally misleading. The geographic origins of a
particular long-dead ancestor, which might be conveyed by those numbers,
is simply not the same as the social classification a juror may associate with
a particular outward physical appearance. When jurors hear that a particular
combination of alleles occurs "in one of 96 billion Caucasians, one of 180
billion Hispanics, and one of 340 billion African-Americans," they will
assume the number applies to the racial category in which they have placed
146. See id. ("[I]ndividual self-classification is not stable; for example, one US study found that
one-third of people change their own self-identified race or ethnicity in two consecutive years."); see
also Christopher J. L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities Across
Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in the United States, 3 PLoS MED. 1513, 1521 (2006) ("The
most important limitation of the data used for our analysis is that reported race in the census, used
for population estimates, may be different from race in mortality statistics, where race may be
reported by the family, the certifying physician, or the funeral director.").
147. Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1093,
1096 (2004).
148. See generally Duana Fullwiley, The Biologistical Construction of Race: 'Admixture'
Technology and the New Genetic Medicine, 38 Soc. STUD. SCI. 695 (2008).
149. McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Smedley &
Smedley, supra note 139, at 20).
150. McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting Smedley & Smedley, supra note 139, at 20).
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the defendant based on a subjective interpretation of outward physical
appearances, regardless of the defendant's actual (and unknown) ancestral
origins. The influence of the numbers masks the unspoken assumptions.
But there is a greater problem with the legal profession's awe of
numbers. By relinquishing authority to those who control the numbers,
courts have abandoned their responsibility to consider the harm caused by
unnecessary "race speech" in court. This cavalier attitude was expressed by
the California Supreme Court when it endorsed the admission of expert
testimony presenting a range of racially-characterized genetic profile
frequencies: "Presenting the objective data in the manner in which such
information is collected and analyzed within the scientific community does
not inject inappropriate racial assumptions or issues into the litigation."s1
Courts must not be so intimidated by "objective data" that they fail to
consider the harm created whenever race is introduced into a courtroom
discussion. In the story of Snake Eyes,152 the race of Dennis was irrelevant;
indeed, I suspect, it was outside of most readers' thoughts until racial
testimony brought the issue to the reader's attention. Courts should not
casually permit the insertion of race into a juror's analysis.
When the prosecutor puts forth racially-categorized statistics, it
immediately raises the question of the relevance of race. Imagine if, at a
trial of an African-American defendant, a juror is told that the DNA found at
the scene of the crime matched the defendant and that this type of DNA
occurred in one out of 10,000 United States Caucasians and one out of 10
billion African Americans. The relevance of the DNA would depend on the
jury's determination as to how likely it was that the crime had been
committed by an African-American. This is so because there would be
thousands of Caucasians whose DNA would match that of the DNA found at
the crime scene, but very few, if any, other African-Americans' DNA would
match. Thus, if the jury believed that an African-American committed, or
would be likely to commit, the crime, the overwhelming likelihood would be
that the defendant was the culprit.
This sort of racial thinking is inherent in the use of racial categories
because "by highlighting, without compelling justification, the racial
distinctions that have historically divided us," the government is expressing
"an improperly divisive conception of the public."'13  Historically, and
unfortunately even today, "[t]he word 'race' suggests that human beings can
151. People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864, 871 (Cal. 2006); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H.
Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REv. 413, 449 (2001) ("No group is
singled out for special treatment, and no one is penalized because of hostility toward race.").
152. See supra text accompanying note 40.
153. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1538 (2000).
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be divided into subspecies, some of which are morally, intellectually, and
biologically inferior to others."' 54
The Supreme Court has recognized this danger, even when no particular
group was being treated "differently." In Anderson v. Martin,'" the Court
struck down a Louisiana statute requiring that ballots designate the race of
candidates for elective office. The Court stated that, although Louisiana was
not restricting any voter's individual choice, "by directing the citizen's
attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that
a candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-
consideration in the citizen's choice .... ." The unconstitutional evil arose
because, by "placing a racial label on a candidate[,] ... the State furnishes a
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against
one group because of race and for another."' 7
When not under the hypnotic influence of numbers, courts readily
recognize the danger of governmental use of race-based categorizations:
"[R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification."' Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has frequently declared that, "all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 59  A racial
classification will only pass strict scrutiny if it is necessary for furthering
some compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to further that interest.160
Conceding that the accurate determination of a criminal defendant's
guilt or innocence is compelling still leaves the critical question of whether
154. Hoffman, supra note 147, at 1099.
155. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). The Louisiana law stated:
Every application for or notification or declaration of candidacy, and every certificate of
nomination and every nomination paper filed in any state or local primary, general or
special election for any elective office in this state shall show for each candidate named
therein, whether such candidate is of the Caucasian race, the Negro race or other
specified race.
Id. at 400 n. 1. The law also required that "[t]he racial designation on the ballots shall be in print of
the same size as the print in the names of the candidates on the ballots." Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18:1174.1(A), (C) (Supp. 1960).
156. Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402.
157. Id.
158. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
159. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); accord Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
160. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.").
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the racial categorization of DNA is "necessary" for and "narrowly tailored"
to the making of that determination.' 6 1 Obviously, if there were any racially
neutral way of presenting the DNA information in a meaningful fashion, the
Constitution would require the FBI and courts to forego the race-based
approach.
Fortunately, there is a relatively simple mathematical solution to this
problem that will fulfill the "desire for a race-blind figure in a general-
population case."l62 All that is required is the use of what mathematicians
call a "corrective factor."' 63  Mathematicians often add so-called corrective
factors to their equations so that their generalized theoretical predictions can
more accurately reflect particular factual situations.16 For example, when
calculating back pay in one case, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission determined that using only the hourly wage would not
represent the full amount of money lost, and proposed "a corrective factor to
be placed in the formula which would accurately reflect the effect of
overtime hours."1 65  In a similar fashion, the National Committee on the
Future of DNA Evidence has shown that, by placing the appropriate
"corrective factor" in the equations for calculating genetic probabilities, "the
necessity for group classification could be avoided by using an overall U.S.
database."'6 Significantly, the Committee reported that it was able to
161. One instance in which such racial categorization might be necessary is when dealing with
ethnic subpopulations. For example, assume that there is a small group whose members share a
genetic anomaly that is not seen with any other group. Using a general population database might
lead to a finding that the defendant was probably guilty (since very few Americans match the DNA
found at the crime scene). However anyone in his subgroup would have matched that DNA as well.
In such a case, use of ethnic data bases would be appropriate. See Kaye & Sensabaugh, Reference
Guide on DNA Evidence, supra note 51, at 526; see also R. C. Lewontin, Letter to the Editor, Which
Population?, 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 205, 205 (1993).
162. David H. Kaye, DNA Probabilities in People v. Prince: When Are Racial and Ethnic
Statistics Relevant?, in PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DAVID A. FREEDMAN
289, 300 (Deborah Nolan & Terry Speed eds., 2008), available at
http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb-Display&handle=euclid.imsc/1 2075
80069.
163. See, e.g., ELLERY WILLIAMS DAVIS & WILLIAM CHARLES BRENKE, THE CALCULUS 170
(1912) (stating that, for a particular formula used to find the measure of the bending of a curve, "the
corrective factor ... gives a better measure of the bending .... .").
164. Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert World, 66
UMKC L. REv. 251, 277, 287 n.154 (1997).
165. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 443 F. Supp. 696, 711-12 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
166. FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING, supra note 120, at 5. The specific corrective factor
they gave is 0= .03 for the formula used to determine match probabilities for various alleles
(designated ";") and the frequency (designated "pi") in which they occur:
[20 + (1-0) pt][ 3 0 + (-0) p;] / [(1 + 0)(1 + 20)].
Id. at 24.
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convert to a race-neutral formula so easily because genetic differences "are
mainly between individuals rather than between group averages."' 67
Because a scientifically sound basis exists for using general database
probabilities, the continued use in criminal trials of race-based statistics
cannot be legally justified. Judges must tell genetic statisticians that the
emphasis on race "makes racial divisions too salient."'6  The legal system
must reassert itself and prohibit "the placing of the power of the State behind
a racial classification that induces racial prejudice .. ..
IV. BIGOTED NUMBERS
Sometimes, the problem with numbers is not that they induce prejudice
in others, but that the very use of numbers is unknowingly bigoted.
Consider the case of an insurance company which, in 1962, charged African-
Americans more than twenty-eight percent more than Caucasians for the
identical life insurance policy.o70  The insurance company defended this
discriminatory treatment as justified by statistics showing that, at the time of
the policy, African-Americans did not, on average, live as long as
Caucasians. 171
Or consider the 2004 case of a three-month-old Native American girl
who was killed when her father, in a rage, threw her to the ground, causing
her to hit her head against the bathroom sink.172  After the father was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the court called for an expert to
calculate the lost future income of the infant so that restitution could be
awarded for the income she would have earned but for her death at the hands
of the defendant.'13  The expert concluded that the restitution should be
167. Id. at 5.
168. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 153, at 1538.
169. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
170. See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 416-20 (5th Cir. 2004). The court noted
that for a "20 Pay Life" policy, in which the insured pays premiums for twenty years and is then
fully insured for the rest of his or her life, a twenty-year-old African-American was charged a
weekly premium of $0.41 for a $500 policy, while a twenty-year-old Caucasian was only charged
$0.32. Id. at 412 n.4.
171. Id. at 412 n.2; see also Arline T. Geronimus et al., Inequality in Life Expectancy, Functional
Status, and Active Life Expectancy Across Selected Black and White Populations in the United
States, 38 DEMOGRAPHY 227, 235 (2001).
172. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1291 (D. Utah 2004), af'd sub nom. United
States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2007).
173. Id at 1292. The restitution award was authorized by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act,
which provides that families of victims of certain crimes will be awarded, as restitution, a sum
representing the total income lost due to the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2)(C) (2006).
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reduced to account for the victim's race and sex; he thus recommended an
award of $171,366, which was more than forty-four percent lower than his
estimate of lost wages for all Americans of that age, $308,633.174
One can make a numeric defense of such disparate treatment. After all,
statistics do show that, on average, African-Americans die five years earlier
than white Americans.175  Statistics also show that African-Americans earn,
on average, less than whites, and women, on average, earn less than men.176
Moreover, numbers show that "women have, on average, spent fewer years
in the workforce than men, largely because many women have taken time
off from work in order to raise children." 77
Backed by such hard numbers, most courts have been quite willing to
make decisions which result in different financial outcomes, depending on
the race and gender of the parties. As Professor Martha Chamallas has
noted: "[I]t is commonplace for expert witnesses to rely on gender and race-
based tables to determine both the number of years that a plaintiff would
likely have worked (work/life expectancy) and the likely annual income the
plaintiff would have earned."'7 Thus, in reading opinions awarding
damages, it is not unusual to read statements such as "in 2003, an African-
American female, aged 65, born in and living in the United States, has an
additional life expectancy of 18.5 years";179 "Plaintiff presented evidence
from an economics expert. . .as to the demonstrated earning capacity of
174. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. The court ultimately rejected the expert's
recommendation and awarded the amount calculated without the discount for race and sex. Id. at
1322.
175. Based on the age-specific death rates prevailing for the actual population in 2004, the
National Center for Health Statistics reported that the average white American lives for 78.3 years,
while the average African-American lives for 73.1 years. See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life
Tables, 2004, 56 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_09.pdf.
176. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Highlights of Women's Earnings in
2007, at 8 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.bis.gov/cps/cpswom2007.pdf. See also Caron v.
United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.I. 1975) ("One does not need expert testimony to
conclude that there is inequality in the average earnings of the sexes."), ajJfd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir.
1976).
177. Childers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 76, at
*56 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 26, 1999); see also Sherri R. Lamb, Note, Toward Gender-Neutral Data for
Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 299
(1996) ("[W]orklife tables provide an average for the group, reflecting the historical pattern of actual
years worked, incorporating rates of unemployment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as
incorporating an expected retirement age."). There are also disparities in the average worklife for
African-Americans as compared to whites: "If minority men have historically been incarcerated at a
much higher rate than white men, race-based worklife estimates predict that they will continue to
work fewer years than whites." Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race,
Gender, and the Calculation ofEconomic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1435, 1439 (2005) [hereinafter
Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases].
178. Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1438.
179. Black v. Columbus Pub. Sch., No. 2:96-CV-326, 2007 WL 2713873, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
17, 2007).
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someone of plaintiff's race, sex, age, and educational level"; 80 and "future
earnings [were calculated] based on the average earnings of a college-
educated female of her age."' 8'
Even the federal government relies on sex-based tables. In calculating
the minimum funding requirements for certain pension plans, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) provides mortality tables that can be used for
determining the current liability for individuals who are entitled to benefits
on account of disability. The IRS explains that these mortality tables are
"gender-distinct because of significant differences between expected male
mortality and expected female mortality." 82 Even more emphatically, the
IRS requires that those who wish to use alternate mortality tables for their
pension plans must use tables that treat men and women differently:
"Separate mortality tables must be established for each gender under the
plan." 83
One might expect that even statistically-justified race and gender
distinctions would be met with heightened scrutiny by the courts. Race and
gender are, after all, called "suspect classes" because we "suspect" that
racial and gender classifications are based on stereotyped views of groups
and we "suspect" that, as in the past, these distinctions have the purpose or
effect of harming those in the disfavored category.184 "Yet surprisingly the
reported cases have almost completely neglected the question.",8 s It is as if,
180. Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 (D.D.C. 1996).
181. Forman v. Korean Airlines Co., 84 F.3d 446, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Gonzalez v. City
of Franklin, 383 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) ("Here, for purposes of determining how
many replacement prostheses Gonzalez might need in the future, Gonzalez's counsel used at trial a
mortality table which breaks down the populace by race (white and black) and sex (male and
female). The figure for white males went to the jury."); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d
352, 368 (6th Cir. 1978) ("We have considered as well her sex, her race, the necessarily limited
evidence concerning her mental capabilities, and her psychological makeup."); Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D. Conn. 1974) (stating that eight years is the "middle
of the range of a professional woman's likely hiatus from her principal occupation in order to raise a
family"), affg in part, 524 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1975); Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir.
1972) (stating that female plaintiff would probably marry and have children "with consequent
substantial interruptions of gainful employment").
182. Mortality Tables for Determining Present Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 44632, 44633 (July 31, 2008)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
183. Mortality Tables Used to Determine Present Value, 26 C.F.R. § 1.430(h)(3)-2(c)(1)(i)
(2009).
184. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect").
185. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004), affd sub nom. United
States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2007). There are a handful of cases in which judges
have recognized the dangers posed by race and gender based statistics. See, e.g., McMillan v. City
of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F.
803
when faced with race- or gender-based statistics, "we tend not to notice the
discrimination and to accept it as natural and unproblematic."1 86
The power of these numbers can be so great that even well-meaning
judges shrink from confronting them. In holding that lost wages for a
female plaintiff needed to be reduced to reflect the average woman's lower
salary, one judge bemoaned: "I am constrained to agree with the defense that
the present value of prospective earnings, female wages before taxes must be
used. However sympathetic this Court may be to equality in employment, it
must look to the reality of the situation and not be controlled by its own
convictions."8
The true "reality of the situation," however, is that a reluctance to fully
understand what numbers can and cannot tell us has caused the justice
system to accept and enforce needless discrimination. The reliance on race-
and sex-based statistics should be rejected as both bad mathematics and bad
policy.
The first mistake made by those who rely on race- and sex-based
statistics is that they ignore one of the cardinal principles of statistics:
correlation does not prove causation.'18  The fact that the month with the
fewest days has the most snow days does not imply either that short months
cause snow or that snow causes short months.
Nonetheless, statistical correlation may still be relevant for predicting
the future. We can often use past experience to guess what is likely to
happen in the future. Thus, over a span of several years, we can expect that
the shortest month generally will continue to be the one that tends to
experience the most snow days.
There is a critical assumption, though, which enables us to use statistics
of what has already happened to predict what is still to come. For the past to
predict the future, the future must resemble the past.189 To continue our
short month-snow day analogy, assume that a new leader takes power and
changes the calendar. Declaring that summer vacations are too long and
wasteful, this despot decrees that July and August shall henceforth only have
twenty-one days, and that the remaining ten months would each get an
Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.333d 120 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987), affd in part, 863 F.2d 149
(1st Cir. 1988); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r of Pa., 482 A.2d 542, 582 (Pa.
1984).
186. Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1442.
187. Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 397-98 (D.R.I. 1975), aj'd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir.
1976).
188. See, e.g., SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS: A CRITICAL THINKING
APPROACH 15 (2003) ("Correlation does not imply causation.") (emphasis omitted).
189. See Lamb, supra note 177, at 329-30 ("Statistical tables 'predict' the future only to the
extent that the future resembles the past; a predictor is efficient only if past correlations persist
throughout the period in which the predicted event will occur.") (citation omitted).
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additional two days. Suddenly, our prediction that the shortest month will
have the most snow days is obsolete, even though the statistical analysis on
which it was based remains unchanged.
Similarly, a law student in 1963, wondering if his future granddaughter
would attend law school, would have been badly misled by statistical tables.
He would have been told that only 4.2% of law students were women and
that, looking backwards, the numbers had barely budged over the preceding
decades.' 90 Fast-forward to the present, and we see that almost half of all
law students are women.191 This monumental change, due largely to the
women's movement and anti-discrimination laws, would not have been
incorporated into statistical tables.
Great social change continues into the 21st century (does anyone really
need to say "President Obama"?). Even today's mortality rates are different
from just a few years ago. According to the Centers for Disease Control,
"[d]ifferences in mortality between men and women continued to
narrow."' 92 Similarly, since 1989, the age-adjusted death rates "for the black
and white populations have tended toward convergence."l 93
For race- and gender-based statistical tables to accurately foretell the
future, therefore, the circumstances which caused the statistical differences
would have to continue. The only way to mathematically justify the use of
race- and gender-based statistical tables for predicting the future is to assume
either that existing discrimination (and its effects) will continue or that the
race- and gender-based distinctions are innate and inevitable.194 Not only
are these propositions offensive, pessimistic, and wrong,' 95 but also
190. According to the American Bar Association, for the academic year 1963-1964, there were
20,776 first year law students: 19,899 men and 877 women. American Bar Association, Enrollment
and Degrees Awarded, 1963-2008,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%201 .pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
191. For the academic year 2007-2008, 47.3% of the first-year law school class were women; out
of 49,082 first year students, 25,864 were men and 23,218 were female. Id
192. Hsiang-Ching Kung et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2005, 56 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 2
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_10.pdf. The age-adjusted
death rate for men in 2005 was 40.4% greater than that for women, which was down from being
40.7% greater in 2004. Id.
193. Id. at 4. According to the CDC, "[dleath rates declined by 10.6 percent for the black
population and by 7.0 percent for the white population between 1989 and 1997, and they have
declined by 10.8 percent for the black population and by 8.2 percent for the white population since
1997." Id.
194. See e.g., Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1455 ("Relying
on race and sex-based statistics reinforces the view that race and sex differences are inevitable and
enduring, rather than a product of political and social arrangements that are subject to change.").
195. See, e.g., Chamallas, Questioning the Use, supra note 142, at 75 ("The use of race-based and
gender-based tables assumes that the current gender and racial pay gap will continue in the future,
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evaluating their likelihood is not within a statistician's skill set.
Determining whether discrimination and the effects of past discrimination
will be negated by both the legal system and social changes is, most
emphatically, not the province of statisticians. The justice system cannot
allow itself to be so intimidated by a statistical statement that it overlooks
the need to make its own evaluation; indeed, "any decision to use a group-
based projection into the future ... involves normative judgments about the
relevant frame of reference and the rate of future change."' 96
For example, as previously discussed, America's fascination with racial
analysis often masks, rather than reveals, the truth.'97 While African-
Americans, on the average, have a shorter life expectancy than their white
counterparts, a large proportion of that difference is due to socioeconomic,
not racial, differences. One demographic study found that, "[w]hite
residents of urban poor areas have mortality profiles comparable to those of
black residents of poor rural areas and blacks nationwide. .*.."198 The life
expectancy of these whites was found to be, in fact, lower than that for
"residents of relatively advantaged black urban areas."l99 The
socioeconomic factor is disregarded in the life expectancy tables. As Judge
Jack Weinstein noted, "[g]ross statistical tables do not answer the question:
how does the life expectancy of well-off or middle-class 'African-
Americans' compare to that of poor 'African-Americans?"' 20o Thus, he
concluded, courts should reject the use of racially based tables that tend to
"enforce the negative impacts of lower socio-economic status while ignoring
the diversity within populations."201
Courts should also recognize that to the extent the differences reflected
in the race- and gender-based tables are caused by ongoing discrimination,
using those tables reinforces the harm caused by wrongful discrimination.
As one court ruled, "it would be inappropriate to incorporate current
discrimination resulting in wage differences between the sexes or races or
the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for
despite ongoing legal and institutional efforts to make the workplace more diverse and less
discriminatory.").
196. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies, 1865-
2007, 27 REv. LmG. 37, 56 (2007).
197. See supra notes 115-169 and accompanying text.
198. Geronimus, supra note 171, at 234-35; see also Joseph J. Sudano & David W. Baker,
Explaining US Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health Declines and Mortality in Late Middle Age: The
Roles of Socioeconomic Status, Health Behaviors, and Health Insurance, 62 Soc. Scl. & MED. 909,
918 (2006) ("Our results are also consistent with previous studies that have found large 'direct' (or
residual) effects of [socioeconomic status] on health that were not explained by differences in health
behaviors.").
199. Geronimus, supra note 171, at 234-35.
200. McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
201. Id. at 253.
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damages resulting from lost wages."202 This is especially true in tort cases,
where victims have been deprived of their "chance to excel in life beyond
predicted statistical averages." 203
The use of these statistical averages causes harm in a great many ways.
The most obvious way is that some injured tort victims receive far less of a
remedy than other equally injured tort victims, based solely on their race or
gender.204 Because of a long history of discriminatory treatment, the
"explicit use of race-based and sex-based economic data dramatically
reduces some damage awards for women and for African-American and
Hispanic men."205 In an infamous 1905 case, the court was faced with
determining damages from wrongful death claims for eight claimants whom
it described as "white" or "colored."206  They could not all be treated
equally, the court decreed, due to the "difference in the vitality of the two
races." 207 Accordingly, the judge, "lowered the awards for the deaths of
blacks ten percent more than the awards for the deaths of whites
and ... slashed three of the awards for blacks by forty percent or more." 208
Racial and gender differences in income continue today. According to a
2007 report by the U.S. Department of Commerce, non-Hispanic white men
had annual median earnings of $47,814, while African-American men's
annual median earnings were more than twenty-five percent lower, at
$34,480.209 Similarly, the median earnings of women, $32,649, is 77.3% of
men's $42,210.210 For some demographics, the differences are even starker;
the average salary for a male Native American is just fifty-eight percent that
for white males. 211 Thus, the use of race- and gender-based statistics will
202. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.333d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Bedonie, 317
F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1319 (D. Utah 2004), (stating that "[als a matter of fairness, the court should
exercise its discretion in favor of victims of violent crime and against the possible perpetuation of
inappropriate stereotypes"), af'd sub nom. United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir.
2007).
203. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
204. Lamb, supra note 177, at 302.
205. Chamallas, Questioning the Use, supra note 142, at 75.
206. The Saginaw & The Hamilton, 139 F. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1905). The claims resulted from
the collision of two steamships, which caused the deaths of both passengers and crewmembers. Id.
207. Id. at 914.
208. Wriggins, supra note 196, at 56.
209. BRUCE H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 15 (2007).
210. Id. at 13.
211. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1313 (D. Utah 2004), affd sub nom. United
States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2007).
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have the undesirable effect of "reinforcing the underlying social inequalities
of our society rather than describing a significant biological difference."212
There is an additional social cost, beyond the "perpetuation of
inappropriate stereotypes."213 Assuming that "the deterrent effect of a legal
action depends on its ability to raise the cost of the undesirable behavior to
the defendant,"2 14 it follows that when damages for injuring members of
minority groups are lowered, the legal regimen will have the perverse result
of encouraging torts against them. Thus, "because it is cheaper to injure
poor minority children, there is less incentive for defendants to take
measures to clean up toxic hazards in the neighborhoods most affected by
lead paint.' 2 15
A further harm caused by the use of race- and sex-based statistics is
analogous to the harm discussed with raced-based DNA testimony: such use
places unnecessary emphasis on factors that are both largely irrelevant and
have a historical record of justifying irrational discrimination.216 As one
commentator noted, "organizing the statistics around race propels race to the
forefront of predictions about individual achievement." 217 The Supreme
Court has made a similar observation about the use of gender-based
statistics. Because each "individual's life expectancy is based on a number
of factors, of which sex is only one[,] . . . [o]ne cannot 'say that an actuarial
distinction based entirely on sex is based on any other factor than sex. Sex
is exactly what it is based on."' 2 18
There have been significant instances where the fundamental interest in
equality has overwhelmed the power of the statistical average. Most
notably, perhaps, was the distribution of money from the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund. This fund was established by federal law to
provide compensation for those injured or killed as a result of the 9/11
212. McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Chamallas,
Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1439 (stating that reliance on race and
gender statistics "saddles nonconforming women and racial minorities with generalizations about
their group, the very kind of stereotyping that anti-discrimination laws were meant to prohibit");
Lamb, supra note 177, at 304 (stating that the practice of issuing gender-based awards "magnifies
the impact of employment discrimination and devalues the earning capacity of injured women,
resulting in widely varying damage awards of equally situated men and women for the same injury")
(citation omitted).
213. United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007), quoting lower court
decision, sub nom. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
214. Olga N. Sirodoeva-Paxson, Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors' License to
Steal or Shareholders'Freedom to Vote?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 137 (1998).
215. Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1441.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
217. Laura Greenberg, Comment, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for
Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 429, 447 (2001).
218. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1081 (1983) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712-13(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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attacks. 219 A Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, was appointed to distribute
the funds. One of the thornier issues he had to resolve was how to calculate
the lost earnings of the victims. In calculating the expected work life for the
claimants, the Special Master chose not to "discriminate against women"
and elected to utilize the same worklife table for both men and women.220
The appropriateness of choosing a gender-neutral approach was brought into
sharp focus by the overarching purpose of the compensation fund: "[T]o
serve as a national expression of unity in the face of a tragedy unique in
American history, as well as to help survivors."22' Thus, the transcendent
values of equality and respect for individuals were found to outweigh the
persuasive power of statistics in the extraordinary context of compensating
for the horrors of 9/11. Those values, though, should also be sufficient in
ordinary cases to rebut the need for race- and gender-based statistics.
The Supreme Court took a tentative step toward this goal when it ruled
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
utilizing gender-based statistics in their retirement plans.222 According to the
Court, employers can neither require women to make larger contributions in
order to obtain the same monthly pension benefits as men nor offer their
employees the option of receiving retirement benefits only with companies
that pay lower monthly benefits to a woman than to a man who has made the
same contributions.223 It is irrelevant, the Court explained, whether the sex-
segregated actuarial tables actually, "reflect an accurate prediction of the
longevity of women as a class." 2 4 Indeed, "'[e]ven a true generalization
about [a] class cannot justify class-based treatment.",225
219. See September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.1 (2002). The
statutory authorization for the fund was contained in Title IV of Public Law 107-42. Id
220. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11233, 11238 (Mar.
13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104). Feinberg chose to apply the worklife table for "males" toall
claimants. Id.
221. Michael 1. Meyerson, Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at 4 (week in
review); see also September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed.
Reg. 66274, 66274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104) ("The September l1th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 is an unprecedented expression of compassion on the part of the
American people to the victims and their families devastated by the horror and tragedy of September
11.").
222. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1086. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The Court in Norris also said, in dictum, that the use of race-based
actuarial tables would be similarly illegal. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1086.
223. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1086; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
224. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
225. Id. at 1084 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708). Thus, the Court said, "the greater costs of
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Though these rulings were based on a particular federal statute, the
reasoning can be applied equally to a constitutional analysis of the use of
race- and gender-based statistics. The Court recognized that the use of race
and sex to predict longevity was "flatly inconsistent" with the principles of
Title VII, which require "employers to treat their employees as individuals,
not 'as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national
class. "226
Such use of race- and sex-based statistics is equally inconsistent with
constitutional norms because the same principle applies: "At the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that
the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."2 27
It is for the courts, and not the statisticians, to ensure that this command
is obeyed. Courts should require the use of "blended tables," which do not
distinguish based on race or gender, when calculating tort damages.2 28 Just
as insurance companies have elected to stop using race-based statistics due
to the "social unacceptability" of such discrimination,2 29 so should they
cease using gender-based statistics, by force of law, if not voluntarily. 230 If
society is ready to transcend the history of race and gender discrimination,
we must not permit bigoted numbers to slow our progress.
V. RECLAIMING JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOCATING THE
RISK OF ERROR
Mistakes happen. There is no "truth machine" that will tell us with
unwavering accuracy the proper result of a medical test, economic
prediction, or trial.' Ideally, we want to reduce the frequency and degree
providing retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a sex-based retirement
plan." Id. at 1085 n.14.
226. Id at 1083 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
227. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (stating that "[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification" (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action.").
228. Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 1468.
229. BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE§ 13.03 (2008). See generally Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearing Before the S Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1982).
230. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r of Pa., 482 A.2d 542, 549 (Pa.
1984) (terming differential treatment between men and women by an insurance company "unfair
discrimination").
231. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Light and Dark Sides of
"Accuracy" in Criminal Justice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 655, 656-67 (2005).
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of inaccurate results, but imperfection is an inescapable result of the human
condition. Statisticians, who deal in the art of the probable, have devised a
useful way to think about and deal with this inevitability of error.
Suppose, for example, that there was a medical test for determining
whether patients had a particular disease, and, in general, a higher test score
correlated to an increased likelihood of having the disease. Assume that
patients have a range of scores on this test, and a cut-off point is needed for
purposes of diagnosis.
There are two situations where the test could be wrong. First, with a
"false positive," healthy patients are diagnosed with the disease.
Alternatively, with a "false negative," diseased patients are mistakenly
termed healthy. In statistics, these would be termed "Type I" and "Type II"
errors respectively. 23 2 No matter which cut-off score you choose, you will
make some errors; there is no perfect point for us to choose.233
Accordingly, the cut-off is chosen based on a determination as to which
kind of error is worse than the other. Raising the cut-off point will result in
more false negatives (more afflicted patients declared healthy) but fewer
false positives (fewer healthy patients deemed afflicted). Lowering the cut-
off point has the opposite effect, causing fewer false negatives (fewer
afflicted patients declared healthy), but more false positives (more healthy
patients deemed afflicted).
Because both kinds of errors will always occur,234 the cut-off point
chosen for determining the presence of the disease will reflect a value
judgment as to which error has more serious consequences. We might prefer
to have fewer false positives, a smaller Type I error, for an employment drug
test, so that we reduce the number of employees wrongfully accused. For
diseases with grave consequences that could be averted only by immediate
action (as when a change in diet could avoid retardation during fetal
development), we might desire fewer false negatives, a smaller Type II rate,
to minimize the possibility that someone with the disease goes undiagnosed.
The choice of the legal standard of proof reflects a similar calculus. As
with the inevitably imperfect diagnostic medical test, there is always the
possibility that the verdict in a trial will not square with the true facts.
In the criminal context, if we convict someone who is innocent, we have
made a Type I error. If we acquit a guilty person, we have made a Type II
232. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 124-26 (2d
ed. 2001).
233. See, e.g., id. at 120-22.
234. Id The only time you would not have both types of error would be if 100% of those tested
fail or 100% pass.
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error. Similarly, in the civil context, finding for the plaintiff where, were the
truth fully known, the defendant should prevail is a Type I error; permitting
the culpable defendant to win the case would be a Type II error. And we
know that errors will be made.
Adjusting the standard of proof affects the frequency of each type of
error. Just as raising the cut-off point results in fewer healthy people being
diagnosed as diseased, the higher we make the standard of proof, the fewer
the innocent people who will be found guilty. The cost, of course, is that
more guilty people will be acquitted.
The Constitution requires the highest standard for criminal cases, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, because of "a fundamental value determination
of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free." 235 This principle predates the Constitution, as reflected
in Blackstone's admonition that English law recognized that it was
preferable for ten guilty persons to escape than for one innocent person to be
convicted wrongfully. 23 6 The Supreme Court has explained that this balance
reflects the fact that the accused has a far greater stake in a criminal trial
than even the Government: "Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-[the] margin of
error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden of... persuading the factfinder . .. of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."237
By contrast, in a civil suit between two parties, where the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant is responsible for some monetary loss, the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is used, signifying that "the cost of
a mistaken verdict for plaintiff is neither greater nor less than the cost of a
mistaken verdict for defendant... ."238 As former Chief Justice (then-
Associate Justice) Rehnquist noted, because the preponderance-of-the-
235. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring): see also Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)(stating that a criminal defendant is entitled to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt")).
236. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 ("[T]he law holds, that it is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.").
237. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
238. D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Signficance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1361(1986) [hereinafter Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?]; see also Neil B. Cohen, The
Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific
Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 943, 950 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role] ("[T]he
preponderance of the evidence standard suggests that the civil litigation system ascribes essentially
equal costs to inaccurately proclaiming a proposition to be demonstrated and to inaccurately
declining to proclaim that the proposition has been demonstrated."); Posner, supra note 7, at 1504("In the typical civil trial, there is no basis for supposing that Type I errors (false positives, such as
convicting an innocent person) on average impose higher costs than Type II errors (false negatives,
such as an erroneous acquittal).").
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evidence standard "allocates the risk of error more or less evenly," it is used
whenever "an incorrect finding of fault would produce consequences as
undesirable as the consequences that would be produced by an incorrect
finding of no fault." 239
In some cases, the Court's evaluation of the undesirability resulting
from incorrect findings has led to the utilization of a "middle level of burden
of proof'-clear and convincing evidence. 240 The Court has required the
Government to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence in civil cases
in which governmental action threatened a significant deprivation of liberty,
such as civil commitment, deportation, and denaturalization.241
This increased burden was selected to ensure that more of the risk of an
erroneous decision would be imposed on the Government: "The individual
should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible
harm to the state."242
The question of when an injury is "significantly greater" is a matter for
judicial determination. For example, in Santosky v. Kramer,243 the Court
struggled with the wrenching issuing of adjudicating the loss of parental
rights. In that case, three children were removed from their parents' custody
after the local Department of Social Services found evidence of abuse,
malnutrition and neglect.24 The issue for the Supreme Court was to
determine the standard of proof the Government needed to establish before
*245permanently terminating parental rights.
A majority of the Justices, citing the "commanding" importance of a
parent's interest in raising his or her child, required the use of the "clear and
convincing" standard.24 6  The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
239. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 788 n.13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist referred to such a situation as occurring "when the social disutility of
error in either direction is roughly equal ..... Id.
240. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (terming
clear and convincing evidence an "intermediate standard of proof").
241. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769; Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-26; Woodby v. INS, 385
U.S. 276, 285 (1966); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
242. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. 745.
243. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
244. Id. at 751.
245. Id. at 747-48.
246. Id. at 758. The Court stated that it was "'plain beyond the need for multiple citation' that a
natural parent's 'desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children' is an interest far more precious than any property right." Id at 758-59 (quoting
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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would "reflect[] the judgment that society is nearly neutral between
erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate
those rights."2 47 The Court stated that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
"standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally between those two
outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity."248
In dissent, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority had
seriously undervalued the harm that would result from erroneously
maintaining parental rights: "If the Family Court makes an incorrect factual
determination resulting in a failure to terminate a parent-child relationship
which rightfully should be ended, the child involved must return either to an
abusive home or to the often unstable world of foster care." 249 Therefore, he
stated, the two types of errors should be viewed as having equal seriousness,
and a "preponderance of the evidence" standard should have been utilized to
determine what was best for the children.250
A second case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,251
presented a similar need to allocate the risk of error. Cruzan involved
parents who wanted to terminate the life support system of their comatose
daughter.252 The Supreme Court permitted the State of Missouri to overrule
the desires of the parents unless the latter could prove "by clear and
convincing evidence" that their daughter would have wanted to avoid further
medical treatment.253 The Court emphasized the State's great interest in the
"protection and preservation of human life," and concluded that: "An
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment . .. is not
susceptible of correction," but "[a]n erroneous decision not to terminate
[could be corrected by] the possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science, [or] the discovery of new evidence
regarding the patient's intent."254
This time, Justice Brennan dissented, contending that the Court had
undervalued the serious harm by incorrectly rejecting the parent's claim:
"An erroneous decision not to terminate life support . .. robs a patient of the
very qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment.
His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering is
protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more
distorted." 255
247. Id. at 765.
248. Id. at 766.
249. Id at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
250. See id. at 786-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
251. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
252. Id. at 265.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 283.
255. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In all of these cases, the Supreme Court has struggled to make a careful,
nuanced determination as to whether greater harm resulted from one type of
error or the other, and then selected the legal standard that incorporates that
determination. What matters for this discussion is not whether one agrees
with their ultimate determination in any of these cases. Rather, the point is
that it is the courts' task to make the normative determination of the harm
that would be caused by both types of erroneous decisions, and to adjust the
legal standard accordingly.
Unfortunately, as soon as numbers appear in a case, courts appear to
abdicate their policy-making responsibilities. For example, in Castaneda v.
Partida,256 the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Texas
system for selecting members of a grand jury discriminated against
Mexican-Americans. The most important evidence for the criminal
defendant challenging the system was a comparison of the percentage of
Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County with the percentage on grand juries.
After a brief statistical analysis, the Court concluded that any claim that "the
jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist."257 That is,
however, the wrong question. Whether the statistics would convince a
"social scientist" is largely irrelevant; instead, the Court should be asking
whether the statistics are legally relevant to resolving the issue at hand.258
That decision must incorporate the consideration of how the justice
system should balance the risk of erroneously finding discrimination in a fair
system with the risk of erroneously finding neutrality in a discriminatory
grand jury selection process. While mathematical analysis is necessary to
explain to the court the meaning of the numbers, the value-laden evaluation
of the comparative seriousness of the harms involved should never be a
mathematical decision.
To understand how courts have forfeited their proper role and how they
can reclaim it, we must understand the statistical process of hypothesis
testing. For that exploration, I will present another story, called Heads You
Win,259 to demonstrate the value judgments implicit in hypothesis testing,
256. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
257. Idat496n.17.
258. Three months after Castaneda was decided, the Court, in Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977), cited Castaneda for the proposition that a finding of
two or three standard deviations meant that then the hypothesis that teachers in this case were hired
without regard to race "would be suspect." However, the Hazelwood Court did not say to whom
they would be "suspect." Id
259. For an explanation of coin toss probabilities, see infra note 280.
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and to show how and why judges must reassert their rights (and obligations)
to make those judgments.
Heads You Win
Sally is an elderly art collector who wants to give away the most
valuable piece in her collection to one of her two children. She
invites them to her house and tells them that she wants to play a
game to decide who gets the painting. She opens a fresh roll of
quarters and gives one to her son Charles and one to her daughter
Lisa. . "The game is simple," she says. "Each of you will flip your
quarter ten times. Whoever flips heads the most gets the picture.
But, if I catch you cheating, not only will you not get the painting, I
will leave you out of my will." Charles and Lisa take turns flipping
their coins while Sally marks the number of heads that each child
flips. When the final scores are tallied, Charles has won with ten
heads, while Lisa only has five. Lisa turns to her mother and
shouts, "It's not fair. He can't be that lucky. He must have
cheated."
Based on the evidence, how is Sally to proceed? More particularly,
what do the numbers tell her about the likelihood that Charles cheated?
The case of Heads You Win will turn on how we think about unlikely
events. While it may seem counterintuitive, every possible outcome of the
ten coin tosses is, on one level, unlikely. Because a fair game might suggest
there is an equal fifty-fifty likelihood of flipping heads or tails on a single
toss, flipping heads on half the tosses, five heads out often, would seem to
be a likely event. Such thinking, though, ignores the fact that out of ten
tosses there are actually eleven possibilities (ranging from zero heads to ten
heads). While five is indeed the most likely of the eleven possibilities, one
should actually expect to get five heads out of ten tosses fewer than twenty-
five percent of the time. While that is the least unlikely event, variation
from that ideal would hardly be unexpected.
Similarly, when examining a sample, whether a statistical survey or the
scores some people obtained on a job test, one should expect that the sample
will not be a perfect representation of the entire population. 260 Similarly, the
mere fact that the price of a stock rises the day after information is released
does not prove that the stock increase was noteworthy, let alone linked to the
information. There is an inevitable volatility in stock prices that might
account for the increase.261
260. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 116 ("[A] sample is
unlikely to be a perfect microcosm of the population.").
261. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
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Statisticians have a way of calculating the expected volatility in a
sample. The mathematical phrase is "standard deviation," which can be
thought of as "a measure of spread, dispersion or variability of a group of
numbers."262 The standard deviation is determined based on the amount
each element of the sample differs from the average.263 While there are
precise mathematical formulas for calculating standard deviation, there is
great benefit to be derived from considering the plain English meaning of
the phrase. The phrase "standard deviation" means that, for every statistical
sample, some divergence from the center, from the "normal," is to be
expected. It is, indeed, "standard," for any specific result to be somewhat
different from another.2 6
But the phrase "standard deviation" also implies something else-not all
deviations are standard. A degree of variation is to be expected, but some
variations are so extreme as to be "non-standard" and surprising. When
those surprising variations occur, it makes statisticians consider the
possibility that their original expectations might have been mistaken.
To return to the mathematical definition of "standard deviation," the
more standard deviations a result is from the expected result (oft times the
mean), the less likely one is to see it. The most common mathematical
calculation for standard deviation involves what is known as a "normal
distribution." 265  The normal distribution can be thought of as the classic
"bell curve," a symmetric distribution with the highest total occurring in the
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (1991) ("To test for such
statistically significant returns, it is necessary to account for the usual volatility of returns, which
varies across firms and over time.").
262. DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 359
(1980).
263. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 174. Depending on the
statistical test being utilized, there are numerous formulas for standard deviations. See ARTHUR M.
GLENBERG, LEARNING FROM DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL REASONING 66 (2d ed.
1996).
264. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 117 ("An estimate based
on a sample is likely to be off the mark, at least by a little, due to random error.").
265. The normal distribution shows the probability of a continuous range of possible occurrences.
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 232, at 113. It is a perfectly symmetric curve around the
mean, with probabilities above the mean identical to corresponding probabilities below the mean.
See id. Even though life is usually not neat enough to fall into a normal distribution, statisticians are
often able to work with data in such a way that it approximates the normal distribution. See WAYNE
C. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS 71 (1983). In fact, "[allthough stock returns
are actually not distributed normally, researchers have shown that the normal distribution is a good
approximation for event study estimations." Macey et al., supra note 261, at 1039. Despite the
seeming prevalence of statistical use of the normal distribution, other distributions, such as binomial
distributions, are also utilized by statisticians. See, e.g., D. G. REES, ESSENTIAL STATISTICS 73-74
(4th ed. 2001).
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middle and smaller totals occurring as one goes to either extreme.266 With a
normal distribution, a little more than two-thirds of all results will be within
one standard deviation of the mean.2 6 7 Slightly fewer than one-third of all
results are more than one standard deviation away.268 Thus, the mere fact
that results occur one standard deviation from the mean is not particularly
shocking. An occurrence with a one-third probability, say rolling a one or
two with a single die, would not raise any eyebrows.
Once we move more than two standard deviations from the mean,
however, suspicions often rise. Because the probability is approximately
95.5% that a randomly selected result will fall within two standard
deviations of the mean, there is a less than five percent chance of seeing a
result that is more than two standard deviations from the mean.269
In Heads You Win, the task for Sally is to determine whether the specific
result Charles obtained, ten heads out of ten tosses, is so surprising as to
raise the specter that the tosses were not fair. To make that determination,
statisticians might suggest that she use hypothesis testing to quantify this
intuition.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of hypothesis testing is that usually
it does not actually test the proposition in which one is most interested.270
Rather, hypothesis testing generally examines the likelihood that the
opposite of what you care about is true.27 ' For example, the question Sally
needs to decide is whether Charles cheated. No mathematical tool exists for
determining this directly. Instead, an examination of the data through
hypothesis testing is a journey in indirection. The focus of the hypothesis
test would be an evaluation of the probability of seeing Charles's result (ten
heads) had he not cheated.272 Specifically, all that a hypothesis test can
show is "whether an observed result is so unlikely to have occurred by
chance alone that it is reasonable to attribute the result to something else."273
We are left with a double negative. The test cannot tell us if Charles
probably cheated; at best, it can tell us something like "Charles probably did
not 'not cheat."'
274
266. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 232, at 113.
267. More precisely, the probability that a randomly selected value will be within one standard
deviation of the mean is about 68.3%. See CURTIS, supra note 265, at 73.
268. The probability that a randomly selected value will be greater than one standard deviation of
the mean is about 31.7%. Id.
269. See id. Results more than three standard deviations from the mean are even rarer. The
probability of being more than three standard deviations from the mean in a normal distribution is
less than one percent, approximately .3%. Id.
270. See CURTIS, supra note 265, at 119.
27 1. Id.
272. Note that this is not the same as an evaluation of the probability of there being no cheating.
273. Kaye, Is ProofofStatistical Signficance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1333.
274. See Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 122 ("Regrettably,
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The first step in hypothesis testing is to identify what we want to
ascertain, namely the proposition that Charles's result is a product of
cheating. This is sometimes described, ironically, as the "alternate
hypothesis." 27 5  If there were multiple possible causes for the result, i.e.
maybe the coin was not fair to begin with or maybe Sally herself doctored
the coin, there would be several ways to phrase the alternate hypothesis.276
For this example, assume that if the process was not fair, Charles cheated.
Sally would then label the opposite proposition, that Charles's result of
ten heads is a product of random chance, as the "null hypothesis."277
Generally, the null hypothesis is a statement that "differences in the sample
are due to the luck of the draw."278 In logical terms, we can say that if the
null hypothesis is false, the alternate hypothesis is accurate. Thus, the goal
of hypothesis testing is to attempt to disprove the null hypothesis.
To do that, Sally would calculate what is known as a "P-value." For
different types of data, different statistical tests would be used to determine
the P-value, but all are generally designed to answer one question: What is
the probability of seeing a result as "extreme" as the result actually seen if
the null hypothesis were true?279 Sally would discover that the P-value for
Charles's result is less than one percent, only about 0.00098.280
multiple negatives are involved here. A statistical test is essentially an argument by contradiction.").
275. The "alternate hypothesis" is also termed H1. REES, supra note 265, at 141.
276. See, e.g., Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1355
("[T]here are always other alternatives besides the one the statistician identifies as H, in formulating
the test."). For a discussion of the importance of correctly describing the alternate hypothesis, see
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1048, 1055 (1985) ("[T]he
form of the alternative hypothesis can affect the conclusion that one reaches from the statistical
analysis.").
277. The "null hypothesis" is also termed Ho. REES, supra note 265, at 141.
278. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 122. Another way of
describing the null hypothesis is to state that "the difference observed in the data is then just due to
sampling error." Id at 173.
279. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 117.
280. See Kaye, supra note 238, at 1350. If you toss a coin, there are only two possible outcomes
for each toss. If you toss it ten times, the total number of possible outcomes is 2 ^10 = 1024. Id. Of
these, there are 252 ways to get exactly five heads (only the first five tosses could be heads, every
other toss could be heads, etc .. .). Thus, the probability of tossing exactly ten heads is 1/1024
0.00098. Id.
The following chart shows the probability of tossing each quantity of heads:
0 heads: 1/1024 = 0.00098
1 head: 10/1024 = 0.00977
2 heads: 45/1024 = 0.04395
3 heads: 120/1024= 0.11719
4 heads: 210/1024 = 0.20508
5 heads: 252/1024 = 0.24609
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What does that very small number tell us? It means that it would be
extremely unlikely to see as many as ten heads out of ten tosses as a random
result of a fair process. A statistician would find this result "statistically
significant," and therefore "reject" the null hypothesis that Charles's ten
heads were the result of pure chance. Because the probability of seeing ten
heads for ten tosses is so small under the null hypothesis, Charles's result
would "be strong evidence" that the coin toss was not fair.28 1
To understand what it means to say that the probability was "so small"
that it would be strong evidence of an unfair toss, we can change the plot of
Heads You Win. Suppose that instead of ten tosses, Sally asked for one
hundred tosses and Charles had tossed sixty heads out of his one hundred
tosses. If his sister again accused him of cheating, the analysis would need
be slightly different. We would not use a null hypothesis based on exactly
sixty heads appearing as a product of random chance. If the allegation is
that "he can't be that lucky," we need to consider the probability of a
random person being precisely that lucky (sixty heads out of one hundred
flips) or even luckier (tossing sixty-one heads out of one hundred flips,
tossing ninety heads, etc.). In fact, to see how "extreme" sixty heads is,
statisticians would want to calculate how likely it would be to obtain sixty or
more of either heads or tails. Thus, the new null hypothesis is that tossing
sixty or more heads or sixty or more tails out of one hundred tosses is a
product of random chance. In calculating this new P-value, Sally would
learn that the probability of seeing a result as "extreme" as sixty heads due
to random chance is about 5.69%.282
The key question is whether this result, the probability of seeing a result
as extreme as sixty heads out of one hundred tosses if the null hypothesis
were true, is so small that we should suspect that the coin toss was not fair.
According to statisticians, the magic number for a P-value is .05 (i.e. a five
percent probability), which is approximately two standard deviations. If the
P-value is greater than .05, the results are deemed to be not "statistically
significant," and hence not sufficient to disprove the null hypothesis. 283 A
6 heads: 210/1024 = 0.20508
7 heads: 120/1024= 0.11719
8 heads: 45/1024 = 0.04395
9 heads: 10/1024 = 0.00977
10 heads: 1/1024 = 0.00098
281. Kaye, Is ProofofStatistical Significance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1350.
282. The difference between "extreme" meaning sixty or more heads, and "extreme" meaning
sixty or more heads or sixty or more tails, is the difference between the one-tail test and the two-tail
test. See infra text accompanying notes 415-26.
283. "According to the current paradigm, an observation is deemed 'statistically significant' (test
hypothesis rejected, null hypothesis given consideration) if the p-value is less than 0.05; an
observation is deemed 'not significant' (test hypothesis 'not rejected' or accepted) if the p-value is
greater than 0.05." David Egilman et al., Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of Medical and
Scientifc Evidence Inside the Courtroom-An Epidemiologist's Critique of the Judicial
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test where the P-value must be less than .05 to be deemed statistically
significant is said by statisticians to have a .05 significance level. Another
concept, termed either the "confidence level" or "confidence coefficient," is
defined as being equal to one minus the significance level; thus, statisticians
say that the confidence level for such a test is ninety-five percent.
With such a confidence level, because the P-value is greater than .05,
Sally would not "reject" the hypothesis that the Charles's result is from
random chance.284 This would not mean we had proven that Charles's sixty
heads were actually the result of random chance; it would merely announce
that the data was not inconsistent with the supposition that the result was due
to the luck of the draw.285 Thus, a statistician would conclude that, because
we obtained a P-value of greater than .05, we cannot say that that the null
hypothesis is probably false, and therefore, cannot say that the alternate
hypothesis of cheating is probably true.
The overwhelming majority of courts have accepted as dogma a rule
that any P-value greater than either .05 or less than two standard deviations
is not sufficient to disprove a null hypothesis of random chance. 286 The
Supreme Court, too, has indicated that it leans towards such an approach. In
Castaneda v. Partida,287 the Court was attempting to determine whether
Mexican-Americans had been underrepresented in Texas grand juries. In
comparing the percentage of Mexican-Americans eligible to serve with those
who did serve, the Court stated: "As a general rule for such large samples, if
the difference between the expected value and the observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the
Interpretation of the Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 240 (2003).
284. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of
Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen, Confidence in Probability].
285. Some courts have failed to understand the limited meaning of a failure to find statistically
significant results. One court stated, "[i]f a significant difference is found, the null hypothesis is
rejected. If a significant difference is not found, the null hypothesis is accepted." Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 722 (Tex. 1997). That is incorrect; if a significant
difference is not found, the null hypothesis is "not rejected." We cannot say if the null hypothesis
true.
286. See, e.g., Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII
Litigation: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 455, 467 (1990)
("In fact, courts have applied a 95% confidence coefficient corresponding to a 5% significance level
cut-off in disparate impact cases."); see also Arnold Barnett, An Underestimated Threat to Multiple
Regression Analyses Used in Job Discrimination Cases, 5 INDuS. REL. L.J. 156, 168 (1982) ("The
most common rule is that evidence is compelling if and only if the probability the pattern obtained
would have arisen by chance alone does not exceed five percent.").
287. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist." 2 88 As some
have noted, the fact that the actual number of standard deviations in that case
was "approximately [twenty-nine] standard deviations,"289 combined with
"the casualness of the Court's language in the footnote," indicates that the
Court did not intend to fix a mandatory level for statistical significance.290
Nonetheless, the vast majority of courts considering this question have
opted for the security of replicating the classical statistical model. Without
evaluating whether the concept of statistical significance is equivalent to the
concept of legal significance, 291 courts have generally appropriated the
traditional statistical world view: "Social scientists, and in turn the courts,
have adopted two standard deviations as a threshold measure of statistical
significance." 292
In one case, African-American employees attempted to prove
discrimination by showing that whites had been promoted at a much higher
288. Id. at 497 n.17. Later that year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this statement. In Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977), the Court, in deciding whether a school
district had discriminated against African-Americans in its hiring of teachers, discussed the
statistical comparison between the racial compositions of the defendant school district's teaching
staff with the public school teacher population in the relevant labor market. Id. The Court reiterated
its earlier comments: "The Court in Castaneda noted that '[a]s a general rule for such large samples,
if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three
standard deviations,' then the hypothesis that teachers were hired without regard to race would be
suspect." Id. (quoting Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497 n.17).
289. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497 n.17 (stating that, "[t]he 11-year data here reflect a difference
between the expected and observed number of Mexican-Americans of approximately 29 standard
deviations.").
290. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1283 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
291. See generally Kaye, Is ProofofStatistical Significance Relevant?, supra note 238.
292. Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., I F. Supp. 2d 783, 803 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); see also
Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 60 F. Supp. 2d 220, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in relevant
part, 278 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Courts have frequently adopted a standard of two to three
standard deviations as constituting statistical significance."). See, e.g., Jones v. GPU, Inc., 234
F.R.D. 82, 95 n.53 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Standard deviation units measure statistical significance. 1.96
standard deviation units refers to the level of statistical disparity required to demonstrate legal
statistical significance using a two-tailed test."); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir.
N.Y. 1999) ("If an obtained result varies from the expected result by two standard deviations, there
is only about a 5% probability that the variance is due to chance. Courts generally consider this
level of significance sufficient to warrant an inference of discrimination."); Government v. Penn,
838 F. Supp. 1054, 1070 (D.V.I. 1993) (stating that "statistically significant" refers to "at least a 95
percent probability. . . ."); United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 809 (E.D. Pa.
1989) ("[s]tandard deviation of greater than two or three excludes chance"); Frazier v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 851 F.2d 1447, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The question-the legal question-is what
degree of certainty the courts require for a prima facie case to be established. The 5% level . . . is
commonly accepted among statisticians as an acceptable degree of uncertainty .... ); Palmer v.
Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[S]tatistical evidence must meet the 5% level ... for it
alone to establish a prima facie case under Title VII."); Whelan v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 117
F.R.D. 299, 304 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[Sltatistical evidence is admissible only if that evidence is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level . . . .").
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rate.293 Out of twenty-two total promotions, only five went to blacks.294
Because forty-two percent of the eligible workforce was black, it would be
expected, had there been no discrimination, that forty-two percent of twenty-
two, or 9.24, of those promoted would have been black.295 To determine
whether the difference between the "expected" 9.24 and the "actual" five
was statistically significant, the court used a null hypothesis of "no
discrimination," and calculated how likely it would be to see that more
whites than blacks were hired if the difference were due entirely to random
chance.296 The court announced that when "the difference is less than 2
standard deviations, it is not statistically significant." 297  Because the
difference in this case amounted to 1.84 standard deviations, it did not reach
the two standard deviation threshold.298  "Consequently," the court
concluded, "the plaintiffs failed to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination." 29 9
Obviously, the court's decision to use two standard deviations was the
critical element in its ruling on the existence of differential treatment. Yet,
an accurate understanding of this benchmark reveals that, once again,
mathematically ignorant judges have ceded their responsibility to make
normative policy judgments.
As a starting point, it must be noted that the origin of the .05
significance level was intuition, rather than rigorous mathematics.
Statisticians, working on researching various industrial and agricultural
problems, were attempting to show how their mathematical tools could help
293. Anderson v Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277 (5th Cir. 1994).
294. Id at 1292 n.26.
295. Id.
296. Id
297. Id
298. Id The court used the following formula to calculate the number of standard deviations:
Number of SID - (0-NP)
qNP(l -NP).
SID = Standard Deviations
0= Actual number of blacks who received a promotion
N= Number of workers who received a promotion
P= Probability of a black being promoted from the relevant population
Thus, 5-(22 x 42%) = -1.84.
2.30
Id.
299. Id.
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point to solutions that, when repeated, would prove successful.300 The
founder of modem statistics, 30' R.A. Fisher, wrote, almost cavalierly, "it is
convenient to draw the line at about the level at which we can say: 'Either
there is something in the treatment, or a coincidence has occurred such as
does not occur more than once in twenty trials."' 302  Fisher actually
acknowledged that choice was a subjective choice, not mandated by either
science or math.303 Nonetheless, Fisher's choice quickly became the gold
standard for statisticians.
Far more troubling than the birth of the .05 standard, is that its use leads
to a skewed balancing of the risks of different types of errors. Returning to
our modified version of Heads You Win, if Sally wrongfully concluded that
Charles had cheated when his result was merely the result of random chance,
she would be making the Type I error of incorrectly condemning the
innocent. If, on the other hand, she were to decide mistakenly that Charles's
sixty heads were the result of random chance, though in reality he had
cheated, Sally would be making the Type II error of incorrectly exonerating
the culpable.
As Fisher wanted, the use of the .05 significance level results in
decision-making in which the probability is extremely small that one will
erroneously reject the null hypothesis, for example, by believing that the
result was caused by an unfair system when it was merely the product of
random chance. When people in Sally's position conclude that someone
was not culpable, they will be wrong only five percent of the time.
Put slightly differently, if we imagined a large series of ten coin tosses,
the hypothesis of fairness would sometimes be rejected and sometimes not
rejected. With a P-value of .05, if we rejected the hypothesis of fairness one
300. See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 151 (3d ed. 2008) ("The
preoccupation with significance testing derives from the research interests of statisticians who
pioneered the development of statistical theory in the early 20th century. Their research problems
were primarily industrial and agricultural, and they typically involved randomized
experiments . . . that formed the basis for a choice between two or more alternative courses of action.
Such experiments were designed to produce results that would enable a decision to be made, and the
statistical methods employed were intended to facilitate decision making."). See generally Egilman
et al., supra note 283.
301. See C. Radhakrishna Rao, R.A. Fisher: The Founder of Modern Statistics, 7 STAT. SC. 34
(1992). Indeed, Fisher is credited with coining the very word "statistic." Leonard J. Savage, On
Rereading R. A. Fisher, 4 ANNALS STAT., 441, 452 (1976).
302. Ronald A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, in BREAKTHROUGHS IN
STATISTICS: FOUNDATIONS AND BASIC THEORY 83 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 1993).
303. After discussing other possible standards of significance, Fisher declared: "Personally, the
writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent point, and ignore entirely all
results which fail to reach this level." Id.
304. A Type I error has also been characterized as a "false inculpation" while a Type II error is
termed a "false exculpation." Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 410.
824
[Vol. 37: 771, 2010] Significant Statistics
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
hundred times, we would be making a mistake of assuming a fair coin was
not fair only five times.
Perhaps surprisingly, the .05 significance level does not tell us about the
other sort of error-the Type II error of failing to reject the hypothesis of
fairness when in fact the coin toss was not fair. In our large series of coin
tosses, we do not know how often people in Sally's position fail to identify a
truly unfair coin.
The exclusive focus on reducing Type I errors does more than mask the
existence of Type II errors. Even more problematically, the more we strive
to reduce Type I errors, the greater will be the risk of Type II errors.30 s With
hypothesis testing it is impossible to reduce the risk of both Type I and Type
II errors; thus, a decrease in one results in an increase of the other. 306 We
can see this intuitively with the stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard; fewer innocent people are convicted (Type I error), but more guilty
parties are acquitted (Type II error).307 In general, Type I and Type II risks
are "inversely related," since by reducing one we tend to increase the
other.30s
The precise mathematical relationship between Type I and Type II
errors, however, is not simple to calculate.309  While there is a direct
relationship between the two, it is not a linear relationship; while an increase
in one type of error will lead to a decrease in the other, it will not necessarily
be of an equal amount."o
There is a statistical measure of the ability of a test to prevent Type II
errors. Statisticians use the word "power" to describe the probability of
305. See Macey et al., supra note 261, at 1041 ("The tradeoff, however, is that while the higher
significance level reduces Type I errors, it also increases the probability of Type 2 errors.").
306. In some situations, a researcher can reduce both Type I and Type II errors simultaneously by
increasing sample size. RON N. FORTHOFER ET AL., BIOSTATISTICS: A GUIDE TO DESIGN,
ANALYSIS, AND DISCOVERY 240 (2007). Such an increase, however, may greatly increase the cost
of an experiment. GEOFFREY KEPPEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 195 (2d ed.
1992). Moreover, it will frequently be impossible to alter the number of events available for
evaluation. Id.
307. See Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 411 n. 113 ("It is easy to see, for
any given quantity of data, that a rule of decision that decreases the likelihood of Type I (false
inculpation) errors will increase the likelihood of Type II (false exculpation) errors, and vice
versa."). See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 408-15 (1973).
308. Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 411.
309. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 947 (3d Cir. 1990)
("Unfortunately, the relationship between type one error and type two error is not simple .... .").
310. See, e.g., Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 411 ("Although the two risks
are inversely related in that increasing one decreases the other, they are not simple complements-
that is, they do not add up to one.") (citation omitted).
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properly rejecting the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is
correct.31' A high power means fewer Type II errors. It turns out that tests
using the .05 significance level, while very effective at preventing Type I
errors, generally have low power; they are not particularly good at
preventing Type II errors.
Professors David Kaye and David Freedman provide a useful example
to demonstrate this tradeoff.3 12 An employer plans to use an examination to
select trainees. To see whether there is a disparate impact, the employer
administers the exam to a sample of fifty men and fifty women drawn at
random from the pool of job applicants. If the null hypothesis is that men
and women pass the test at equal rates, and the P-value is set at .05, courts
will mistakenly find a disparate impact-that is, incorrectly reject the null
hypothesis-no more than five times out of one hundred. But what if, in
reality, the test does have a disparate impact such that fifty-five percent of
the men would pass, but only forty-five percent of the women would. In
such a case, courts would mistakenly find no disparate impact more than
eighty times out of one hundred."' Not only would the court be wrong more
than half the time, such a statistical analysis would result in a probability of
an incorrect exoneration that is more than sixteen times the probability of an
incorrect condemnation that statisticians would be willing to accept.
The disparity may actually be even worse than that. Assume that tests
and other hiring practices in this particular industry have always favored
men, such that we may consider the probability that the test favored women
to be negligible. Thus, any disparate impact would find men doing better
than women. The P-value of .05 would then result in courts mistakenly
finding a disparate impact, that is, incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis,
no more than 2.5 times out of 100.314 In such a case, the probability of an
incorrect exoneration is more than thirty-two times the probability of an
incorrect condemnation.
This level of difference between Type I and Type II errors is typical of
hypothesis testing in general. One statistical model demonstrated that, for a
hypothetical employment discrimination case, when the risk of incorrectly
311. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 125 n. 144; see also
Richard Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in Employment Discrimination Cases, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 32, 34 (1985) ("Power is the probability of not making a Type 2 error. In other
words, power is the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis.").
312. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 121-26, 156-59.
313. In the real world, statisticians, when they focus on Type II errors at all, are generally quite
willing to risk many more Type 11 errors than Type I. As one text on biostatistics noted, the "value
of 0.20 for [risk of Type II error] is used frequently in the literature." FORTHOFER, supra note 306,
at 218.
314. The concept that results are only likely to be "extreme" in one direction, i.e. hiring too few
women hired but not too few men, is captured by the concept of a "one-tailed test." See infra text
accompanying notes 415-26.
826
[Vol. 37: 771, 2010] Significant Statistics
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
condemning the innocent employer (Type I error) was set at .05, the risk of
incorrectly exonerating the discriminatory employer (Type II error) was
approximately fifty percent, a ten-times greater risk.
Such a disparity has severe practical consequences for our justice
system. Innocent employers will lose only one time out of twenty, while
injured employees lose half of the time. There may well be legitimate policy
reasons for so allocating the risk of errors in certain circumstances, but
courts rarely engage in this analysis. Far too many judges have been unable
to see the policy choices inherent in the numbers. Instead, they meekly
accept the .05 significance level as beyond their capacity to alter.3 16
The consequence of this mathematical illiteracy is what has been termed
"an arbitrary balancing of the disutilities, or regrets, of Type I and Type II
errors."3t" But such a balancing should reflect a comparison of the social
harms associated with each type of error. While judges have yet to
appreciate the need to make this comparison for the justice system,
statisticians realized early on the need to make their own value judgments
that reflect the cost of different types of errors in their very dissimilar
field."'
As one of R.A. Fisher's students would later remark, Fisher
"vehemently denied" the importance of Type II errors for the work of
statisticians. 319 Fisher himself wrote:
The notion of an error of the so-called "second kind," due to
accepting the null hypothesis "when it is false" may then be given a
meaning in reference to the quantity to be estimated. It has no
meaning with respect to simple tests of significance, in which the
315. See John M. Dawson, Probabilities and Prejudice in Establishing Statistical Inferences, 13
JURIMETRICS J. 191, 201-09 (1973); see also Goldstein, supra 311 (finding in one example that the
risk of a Type II error was almost fifty percent (0.4919) for a significance level of ninety-five
percent). Traditionally, "a twenty percent risk of a Type 11 error is deemed acceptable by
statisticians. . . ." Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard
of Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 821, 841 n.54
(2002). See generally Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 410-12.
316. As the Texas Supreme Court declared: "We think it unwise to depart from the methodology
that is at present generally accepted among epidemiologists .... Accordingly, we should not widen
the boundaries at which courts will acknowledge a statistically significant association beyond the
95% level. . . ." Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 724 (Tex. 1997).
317. Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 412 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
318. Id.
319. Savage, supra note 301, at 441-500.
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only available expectations are those which flow from the null
320hypothesis being true.
One of the reasons for the statistics community's general indifference to
Type II errors is that, in the world of scientific evaluations for which these
tests were designed, such errors are not final. Failing to reject the null
hypothesis of "no effect" is not the same as accepting the proposition that a
given substance or technique actually had no effect. The statistical failure to
reject the null hypothesis is nothing more than "cause to reserve judgment
on the proposition."3 21 As R.A. Fisher explained: "[I]t should be noted that
the null hypothesis is never proved or established, but is possibly disproved,
in the course of experimentation. Every experiment may be said to exist
only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis." 322
In this light, the differing harms for a statistician or scientist of a Type I
versus Type II error become obvious. When a Type I error is made, and a
null hypothesis of "no effect" is incorrectly rejected, a scientist has
mistakenly declared "a predictive rule of nature rests on these test results."323
By contrast, when a Type II error is made and an erroneous null hypothesis
of "no effect" is not rejected, no definitive statement has been made.
Moreover, scientists are free to conduct countless further studies which
might reveal the truth.324 Thus, "the .05 level reflects the social scientist's
conservatism with respect to Type I error." 325
Judges should have a markedly different view of the comparative costs
of Type I and Type II errors. A judge, unlike a scientist, is not "just
deferring decision until more research becomes available. Rather, a judge is
320. RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 17 (8th ed. 1966).
321. Mello, supra note 315, at 842.
322. FISHER, supra note 320, at 18.
323. Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal
Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2183, 2210 (1994). As R.A. Fisher described this world view: "A
scientific fact should be regarded as experimentally established only if a properly designed
experiment rarely fails to give this level of significance." RONALD A. FISHER, The Arrangement of
Field Experiments, in BREAKTHROUGHS IN STATISTICS: FOUNDATIONS AND BASIC THEORY 83
(Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 1993) (emphasis in original).
324. As one commentator noted, "the time frame of science is relatively open-ended." Peter H.
Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, II YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 17
(1993).
325. Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1098, 1099 (1985); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial
Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L.
REv. 335, 364 (1999) ("Indeed, epidemiology is so inherently conservative in its reluctance to
abandon the null hypothesis that it is far more willing to tolerate false negatives-the rejection of a
causal association when one may actually exist-than false positives-the attribution of an
association when one does not exist."); Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, supra
note 238, at 1343 ("[S]ocial scientists adopted the methods and conventions of others who were
concemed primarily with problems in biology.").
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selecting a specific course of action that definitively resolves important
social and legal rights .... 3 2 6 Most significantly, a judicial Type II error,
failing to reject an erroneous null hypothesis of "no effect" or "no
discrimination," is actually a legal acceptance of that false premise.327 When
such a Type II error occurs, a truly-harmed plaintiff is denied relief.
Nonetheless, courts should be somewhat cautious about finding liability
every time numbers vary from expected values. When one contemplates all
of the events that individually are unlikely and considers them all together,
"it would be very unlikely for unlikely events not to occur. "328 Accordingly,
unless one would find a result truly surprising, we should not reject the
possibility that it was the product of random chance.
Thus, in our modified version of Heads You Win, Sally might not be
willing to accuse Charles of cheating just because he obtained sixty heads
out of one hundred tosses. With a greater than five percent likelihood that
his result occurred due to random chance,329 she might well prefer avoiding
the risk of making the Type I error of condemning the innocent and risk the
Type II error of exonerating the culpable. One reason for such a calibration
is that there was no evidence of Charles's malfeasance except for the
numbers themselves. Some have termed the situation where the only
evidence is statistical as "naked statistical evidence."330
The most well-known hypothetical involving naked statistical evidence
is the case of the "Blue Bus," in which a driver is struck by a bus, and the
only evidence available is that eighty percent of the buses that run on the
road where the accident occurred are operated by the Blue Bus Company.
326. Finley, supra note 325, at 366.
327. See, e.g., Mello, supra note 315, at 842 ("A legal adjudicator, in contrast, will treat that
finding as effectively establishing the null hypothesis.").
328. JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
28 (1988); see also Savage, supra note 301, at 473 ("The logic of 'something unusual' is very
puzzling, because of course in almost any experiment, whatever happens will have astronomically
small probability under any hypothesis. If, for example, we flipped a coin 100 times to investigate
whether the coin is fair, all sequences have the extremely small probability of 2-1 if the coin is fair,
so something unusual is bound to happen.").
329. See supra text accompanying note 282.
330. See David H. Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (book review); see
also Richard Lempert, The New Evidence ofScholarship: Analyzing the Process ofProof 66 B.U. L.
REv. 439, 460 (1986).
331. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985). A related hypothetical is the "Gatecrasher" case, in
which the owner of a rodeo discovers that 501 spectators did not pay to enter, while 499 did, and
wants to sue all 1000 spectators on the grounds that it is, statistically speaking, more likely than not
that any one of them did not pay. L. J. COHEN, THE PROVABLE AND THE PROBABLE 74-76 (1977).
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It is generally conceded that the Blue Bus Company will avoid liability for
the accident, even though, based on the statistics, the Company is more
likely liable than not.332
The Blue Bus case presents the issue of how to consider the different
risks of error. The Type I error would be to accept the statistical argument
and find the Blue Bus Company liable when it was really innocent. The
Type II error would be to overlook the statistical evidence and find the Blue
Bus Company not liable when it was really culpable. If we assume that bus
accidents are proportional to the number of busses each bus company owns,
we can calculate how often we would make each type of error, depending on
whether we accept the naked statistical evidence or not. If we would always
find the Blue Bus Company liable based on the statistical evidence alone,
then we would find it liable one hundred percent of the time, even though it
only accounted for eighty percent of the accidents. We would wrongly find
liability, the Type I error, twenty percent of the time. If we never found the
Blue Bus Company liable based on the statistical evidence, then we would
never find it liable, even though it accounted for eighty percent of the
accidents. We would wrongly find no liability, the Type II error, eighty
percent of the time. By ignoring the statistical evidence, we are saying that
we are willing to make four times as many Type II errors as Type I errors.
One of the more common justifications for not finding liability in the
Blue Bus scenario is that "the plaintiffs failure to adduce some further
evidence appears unjustified, because such evidence should be available to
them at little cost."" Thus, the lack of non-statistical evidence of guilt is
itself evidence of innocence.
But that rationale does not cover what the hypothetical implies-the
situation where there is no other evidence to be had.3 34 Assume that the
accident was not severe enough to cause damage to the bus because the
victim was a pedestrian, that it was a rainy evening, which means any blood
would have washed off the bus, and that all a review of other evidence
revealed was a confirmation that eighty percent of the buses that could have
332. In the case from which the Blue Bus hypothetical was drawn, Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58
N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945), a bus company that had the sole franchise for operating buses on the street
where an accident occurred escaped liability when there was no evidence of wrongdoing because the
court found that private or chartered buses could also have used the street: "The most that can be
said of the evidence in the instant case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the
proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident. This was not enough." Id. at 755.
333. D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 54, 56 (1987). Judge Richard Posner agrees that there should be a negative
inference from the lack of supporting evidence, and also contends that the benefit of trying those few
cases for which other evidence could not be readily obtained is marginal. Posner, supra note 7, at
1508-10.
334. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 412 (1986)
("The only sensible way to understand the hypothetical is that it presents the question of what should
be done when this is all the evidence there is.").
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caused the accident were owned by the Blue Bus Company. Or, we could
consider a case where all of the alternate evidence is destroyed through no
fault of either party.
There would still be great reluctance to let the numbers, by themselves,
prove liability in such cases. Why? One way to think about this is to
consider cases where the numbers do prove liability.336
An employer can be found to have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 based on statistics alone that show that a particular employer's
practice had a "disparate impact" based on race or gender. 37  The reason
naked statistical evidence suffices for a finding of liability is that Title VII
prohibits "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation."338 Numbers are quite capable of
communicating that a discriminatory result occurred. The numbers are not
being offered into evidence to show a discriminatory intent on the part of the
employer.
In extreme cases, however, numbers can indeed be a window into
human motivations. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,339 the Court found
a constitutional violation from the fact that more than 200 Chinese laundry
owners had been denied permits to operate their business, while 80 non-
Chinese owners were granted licenses.340 According to the Court, this
numerical disparity was sufficient to "require the conclusion" that the
335. See Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 457, 470 (1991) ("Assuming that all the evidence except one piece has been destroyed without
anyone's fault, a factfinder can still wonder whether that one piece of evidence, if weak, is sufficient
to support a verdict.") (citations omitted).
336. See, e.g., Callen, supra note 335, at 471 ("Courts often hold statistical evidence sufficient to
support a verdict. For example, judges rely heavily on statistics in [T]itle VII cases, and no one
seriously questions their sufficiency. The question is whether, and under what circumstances,
statistics are a sufficient basis for a verdict or for a refusal to enter summary judgment.") (citation
omitted).
337. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer
(1) to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (2006)).
338. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
339. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
340. Id. at 359.
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licensing decisions had been made "with a mind so unequal and oppressive
as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the
laws . . ..
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot342 concluded that
an extreme numerical discrepancy could reveal a bigoted mind. In
reviewing a redistricting plan for Tuskegee, Alabama, which removed from
the city all but four or five of its 400 African-American voters without
removing a single white voter, the Court declared that "the conclusion would
be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical
demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating
white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to
deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote."343
Illegal motivation can also be inferred numerically by, what the Court
has termed, "the inexorable zero." 3" Under this doctrine, the fact that an
employer had hired no women or minorities when some were arguably
available would lead to an inference of discriminatory motive.345 In a sex
discrimination suit against a drug store company, where evidence showed
that the company had hired hundreds of male manager trainees and not
chosen a single woman during a seven and one-half year period, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the employer's contention that "zero is just
a number."34 6 The court explained that "zero . .. carries special significance
in discerning firm policies and attitudes" because even the hiring of two or
three women would indicate "at least some willingness to consider women
as equals in firm management." 347  The total absence of such hiring, in
contrast, indicates an unwillingness to view women as equals, and
accordingly has led courts to be, "particularly dubious of attempts by
employers to explain away 'the inexorable zero' when the hiring columns
are totalled." 34 8
But, absent extreme cases, courts are properly reluctant to find either
bad motive or wrongful actions based on naked statistics as the simple luck
341. Id. at 373.
342. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
343. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
344. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977). Ironically, the facts
of International Brotherhood of Teamsters did not actually involve a "zero," just a large disparity.
Of the 2,919 whites who held driving jobs 1,802 (62%) were higher paid line drivers and 1,117
(38%) were city drivers; of 180 African-American and Spanish-surnamed Americans only thirteen
(7%) were line drivers and 167 (93%) were city drivers. Id.
345. Note, The "Inexorable Zero," 117 HARV. L. REv. 1215, 1215-16 (2004).
346. Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 662 (5th Cir. 1983).
347. Id. In a slightly bizarre analysis, the court distinguished judges from "the noble theoretician
predicting the collisions of weightless elephants on frictionless roller skates [for whom] zero may be
just another integer. . . ." Id.
348. Id.
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of the draw might well supply the reason for a numerical disparity. In such a
case, with no other evidence available, we can treat random chance as a
plausible alibi witness. Thus, courts should be particularly concerned with
avoiding the Type I error of incorrectly finding an improper motive or action
in the absence of other evidence, even if that concern leads to an increase in
Type II errors of exonerating the culpable.349
Evidence of wrongdoing, however, should lead a court to recalibrate its
view of the proper balance between Type I and Type II errors. Imagine that
we knew that the Blue Bus Company's drivers had been drinking at a bar
before they began their routes that evening. 350 With some evidence of
wrongdoing, the no-longer naked statistical evidence begins to look more
convincing.
Returning to Heads You Win, suppose that before Charles had tossed his
sixty heads, he was seen filing the edge of his quarter. Assume because
either he is not especially adept at filing or he deliberately made sure that his
filing was not particularly extreme, his filing resulted in a coin that landed
heads fifty-five percent of the time. If we used a significance level of
ninety-five percent to determine whether Charles's sixty heads resulted from
random chance, we would be more than twenty-four times as likely to
mistakenly clear him when his cheating caused his advantage than we are to
wrongly condemn him when his advantage was due to random chance.'
But why should we accept that disbalance of risks after we have
determined that wrongdoing has occurred? Whether judges admit it or not,
such a disbalance of risks represents a value judgment as to the relative evil
that would result from the different sorts of error. In non-mathematical
cases, such as termination of parental rights or permitting the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment, courts have had little difficulty recognizing that the
349. See supra notes 304-11 and accompanying text (discussing Type I and Type 11 errors).
350. The Gatecrasher story, see supra note 331, can be similarly amended:
Suppose in the gatecrasher hypothetical that the operator of the rodeo testified that a
particular defendant did not buy a ticket. He knows this, he asserts, because the
defendant looks unusual to the operator, the operator sold all the tickets himself, and he
would have remembered such an unusual character.
Allen, supra note 334, at 415.
351. Using a 5% significance level, we would reject the null hypothesis if and only if there were
sixty-one or more heads or tails (as the probability of seeing an event at least this extreme given a
fair coin is 3.52%; by contrast, the probability of seeing an event at least as extreme as sixty heads,
5.69%, is above the 5% threshold). By contrast, the probability of seeing an event at least as
extreme as sixty-one heads given a coin which yields heads 55% of the time is 13.52%; this comes
from a 13.43% chance of seeing at least sixty-one heads and a .09% chance of seeing at least sixty-
one tails. This gives an 86.48% chance of wrongfully clearing Charles, which is about 24.57 times
as large as the 3.52% chance computed above.
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allocation of the risk of error between two outcomes in a particular case
must "reflect properly their relative severity." 352  Courts accordingly have
understood that it is their responsibility to make the value judgment as to
whether "an incorrect finding of fault would produce consequences as
undesirable as the consequences that would be produced by an incorrect
finding of no fault." 353
By passively accepting the ninety-five percent standard for significance,
though, judges are acquiescing in a value judgment that "the social disutility
of wrongful inculpation is many times greater than the social disutility of
wrongful acquittal." 3  The calculation of "social disutility," however, is
properly for courts to make and should vary with the situation. The
selection of the significance level should be made to reflect that judicial
evaluation.
Judges must realize that they are free to choose significance levels other
than ninety-five percent.3 '5  As noted in the Reference Guide on Statistics,
"[a]lthough 95% confidence intervals are used commonly, there is nothing
special about 95%.",356 Indeed, as one court noted, "[d]ifferent levels of
significance may be appropriate for different types of studies depending on
how much risk one is willing to accept that the conclusion reached is
wrong." 357
How much risk we are willing to accept must be based on the values of
the legal system. Unlike scientific inquiry, "the law is oriented toward the
,,358just resolution of cases rather than truth-finding . .. While ascertaining
the truth is a deep value of our legal system, it is often an unobtainable goal
because "verdicts must be rendered even when information is
incomplete ... ."' In the face of incomplete information, errors are
inevitable. The legal system has long recognized that justice requires a
352. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
353. Id at 788 n. 13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist referred to such
a situation as occurring "when the social disutility of error in either direction is roughly equal . . .
Id.
354. Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 413-14.
355. Judges must recognize the difference between the seeming neutrality of numerical analysis
and the value judgments that may lie beneath the surface: "The mechanical quality of the hypothesis
test itself may seem to ensure objectivity, but unless the selection of the significance level is also
objective and sensible, this seeming objectivity is illusory." Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical
Significance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1354.
356. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 118.
357. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 722 (Tex. 1997).
358. Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free "Scientific Knowledge" in
the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 85, 86 (1996); see also Finley, supra note 325, at 366 ("The tort
system should not slavishly follow the values of epidemiology because its purposes and social
functions have always included a 'justice' role that is broader in scope than whether scientists have
arrived at a conclusion, or whatever happens to be the scientific 'truth' consensus of the moment.").
359. Capron, supra note 358, at 86.
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different weighting of risks of error after a finding of wrongdoing by one of
the parties.
For example, in numerous cases, courts have shifted the burden of proof
of causation away from an innocent plaintiff and onto the negligent
defendant, when requiring the plaintiff to prove causation "would be both
unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of
duty of care." 6 o One such case is Kingston v. Chicago & Northwest
Railroad Co.,361 in which the plaintiffs property had been damaged when
two fires united. One fire was attributable to the negligence of the defendant
railroad, the other was of unknown origin.362 The court held that the
defendant should carry the burden of proving that the fire set by him was not
the proximate cause of the damage. 363 The reason for this burden-shifting,
according to the court, was that forcing the plaintiff to prove the causation in
such a situation "would certainly make a wrongdoer a favorite of the law at
the expense of an innocent sufferer."36
Similar reasoning was employed in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,6 5 a
case in which children injured by their mothers' ingestion of DES sued
several DES manufacturers, and were unable to identify who manufactured
the drugs taken by their mothers. The California Supreme Court held that,
even though the plaintiffs could not show which defendant caused their
injuries, each defendant would be presumptively liable for a portion of the
judgment based on its share of the market.6 The court gave two reasons for
removing the burden of proving causation from the plaintiffs. First, the
court said that justice required balancing the risks of uncertainty between the
parties: "[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury."
360. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 263 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
361. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
362. Id. at 914.
363. Id. at 915.
364. Id. One commentator has described the holding in Kingston as an attempt by the court to
devise
an evidence rule that would balance the competing claims. The court protected
individualistic values by retaining the defendant's right to be free from liability unless
there was proof of causation. Status concerns were protected by switching to the
negligent defendant the burden of establishing the cause of the other fire.
Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions: Eradicating the Last
Resort ofScoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 401, 460 (2000).
365. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
366. Id. at 936.
367. Id. at 937.
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Second, the court noted that tort law is designed to deter wrongful
conduct.' In Sindell, the DES manufacturers had known that there was a
"grave danger" that DES could cause cancer in the daughters of pregnant
women who took the drug, yet continued to market the drug as a miscarriage
preventative. 369 The manufacturers also failed to test DES for safety and
ignored tests performed by others that indicated that the drug was not safe.370
In light of such wrongdoing by the defendants, the court ruled that the
DES manufacturers should be forced to carry the burden of proof of
causation based on a "broader policy standpoint."3 7' The DES
manufacturers were in "the best position to discover and guard against
defects in [their] products and to warn of harmful effects; thus, holding
[them] liable for defects and failure to warn of harmful effects will provide
an incentive to product safety."372
A similar shift in the burden of proving causation has occurred in
employment discrimination cases. 7 If an employer is shown to have
engaged in a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice, individual
employees need not prove that the employer's discrimination was the cause
of adverse treatment that the employees personally, individually received.374
Instead there is a rebuttable presumption that an employee was the victim of
the employer's discriminatory practices, and the burden shifts to the
employer to overcome that presumption for each employee.
The Supreme Court has explained this burden-shifting in part with the
normative rationale that the employer who has committed a pattern of
discrimination can no longer be viewed as a presumptively benign actor. 76
It is appropriate to shift the burden of proving individual causation to the
employer because, "the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position
368. Id.
369. Id. at 925.
370. Id. at 926.
371. Id. at 936.
372. Id.
373. A shift in burdens of proof has also occurred in the criminal context. The Supreme Court has
held that the prosecution need only prove the factors that go into sentencing decisions by a
"preponderance of the evidence." McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986). Similarly,
in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997), the Court held that an acquittal on the charge of
using a firearm during a drug offense, did not preclude the judge, during the sentencing phase, from
determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did, in fact, use such a weapon
during a drug offense. As has been discussed, this means that the risk of the defendant suffering an
erroneously increased sentence is treated as no more serious than the risk of the defendant enjoying
an erroneously decreased sentence. Normally, the law considers the harm of a wrongful conviction
as far greater than the harm of an erroneous acquittal. That calculus shifts in the sentencing phase
because, "criminal sentencing takes place only after a defendant has been adjudged guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." McMillan, 477 U.S at 92 n.8.
374. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 (1977).
375. Id. at 359 n.45.
376. Id. at 359.
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of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer." 311 On a practical and
logical level, that change to the status of "proved wrongdoer" denied the
employer the ability to "claim that there is no reason to believe that its
individual employment decisions were discriminatorily based, it has already
been shown to have maintained a policy of discriminatory
decisionmaking."378  In the case of a proved discriminatory pattern, an
employee's detrimental treatment should be presumed to have been caused
by discrimination because there was "a greater likelihood that any single
decision was a component of the overall pattern."
An analogous burden-shifting should occur in cases involving statistical
evidence. The allocation of the risk of error should not be the same when
Charles is a "proved wrongdoer," guilty of filing the coin, as when there is
no evidence that he committed any wrongdoing. After his attempt to alter
the coin, there is undoubtedly "a greater likelihood" that the coin toss was
not a fair one.
We cannot directly calculate the effect this increased likelihood of an
unfair toss has on the statistical probability previously obtained. In theory,
Bayes' Theorem should provide an equation that permits the combination of
the probability that Charles changed the coin with the statistical probability
into a neat mathematical formula.38 o Unfortunately, Bayes' formula cannot
provide us that information because determining the increased probability
that the coin tosses were unfair is "necessarily subjective." 381 Because the
assessment of that "increased probability" is nothing more than one's
imprecise, non-scientific belief as to the likelihood that Charles succeeded in
his attempt to alter the coin, there is no number we can plug into the
equation to get the correct probability. This is, then, one of those instances
where Bayes' Theorem is most useful as a heuristic device, reminding us
that the persuasive power of statistical evidence depends, in part, on whether
it is consistent with or at variance with the indications we can draw from the
other relevant evidence we may have.382 Taking heed of that lesson, the task
377. Id. at 359 n.45; see also McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1982 ) ("[AIll
doubts are to be resolved against the proven discriminator rather than the innocent employee.").
378. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
379. Id. at 359 n.45; see also Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 966 (1Ith Cir. 2008)
("Because the court's finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the employer to that of
a proved wrongdoer, each class member seeking redress may rely on that finding as circumstantial
evidence that the employer made the challenged employment decision with intent to discriminate.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
380. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
381. Kaye & Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 10, at 127.
382. See Allen, supra note 334, at 402 ("It is becoming increasingly obvious, for example, that
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becomes determining the proper way to combine the hard numbers from the
statistical test with the information that the defendant is a proven wrongdoer.
The question can be better approached by considering the issue of
securities fraud. Under Rule 1Ob-5, it is illegal to manipulate stock prices by
making false or misleading material statements. In order to prevail on a
Rule lOb-5 claim, plaintiffs must show that they relied on those false or
misleading statements to their detriment.384 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,"8 the
Supreme Court ruled that a rebuttable presumption of reliance could be
created through the economic theory known as "fraud-on-the-market." 8
According to the Court:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that,
in an open and developed securities market, the price of a
company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its
business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements ....
In other words, once a plaintiff proves the false or misleading
statements, the next step is to show that those statements affected the market
price of the stock to the plaintiffs detriment.
Generally, economists conduct what is known as an "event study" to
compare the actual return on a stock directly after the misleading statement
is given with the predicted return, yielding a mathematical estimate of what
the return would have been absent such statement.389 This estimate is based
Bayesian approaches can best be used heuristically as guides to rational thought and not as specific
blueprints for forensic decisionmaking."); Lempert, supra note 330, at 446 ("Bayes's Theorem may
be useful as a heuristic device.").
383. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ....
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading ....
384. According to the Supreme Court, "the burden is on the plaintiff to show the violation or the
fact that the statement was false or misleading, and that he relied thereon to his damage." Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (quoting S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13
(1934)).
385. 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
386. Id. at 241.
387. Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
388. This assumes that it can be shown that the market for the securities in question was
"efficient." Macey et al., supra note 261, at 1022-28.
389. Id. at 1029.
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on a statistical test called "regression analysis" which factors in both the
firm's average return during some control period as well as any
contemporaneous market-wide influences, such as news affecting the entire
relevant market which would likely have affected the firm in question as
well.390 The difference between the actual return and the predicted return is
called the "abnormal return." 391
Some variation in returns can be expected, of course, due to the random
chance of a volatile market. A large abnormal return, however, indicates
that it is unlikely that the market was unaffected by the misleading
statement. To determine if the variation in return was caused by random
chance, economists use traditional hypothesis testing.392
First, they establish a null hypothesis that the misleading statements had
no effect on the market.393 Based on the number of standard deviations that
the abnormal return is from the predicted return, they can then calculate the
probability of seeing an abnormal return of such magnitude based purely on
chance.3 94
Assume that a corporation gives out deliberately misleading information
implying high quarterly profits.395 Stock prices rise, but the company
subsequently announces a negative earnings report for that quarter, and the
price of the stock plummets. Shareholders who had purchased after the
dissemination of the misleading information but before the earnings report
was released sue the corporation, and a regression analysis shows that there
is only a ten percent or fifteen percent probability of seeing an abnormal
return as large as that experienced by the company based purely on chance.
The question of whether those statistics indicate that the market was
indeed affected by the misleading statements will turn on our choice of a
significance level.396 According to four of the leading scholars in this area,
Jonathan Macey, Geoffrey Miller, Mark Mitchell, and Jeffry Netter, the
classic P-value of .05 should be utilized: "We suggest choosing a
390. For an excellent discussion of regression analysis, see Rubinfeld, supra note 276, at 1065-
68. See also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 688-94 (2005).
391. Macey et al., supra note 261, at 1029.
392. Id. at 1037.
393. Id. at 1040.
394. Id.
395. This fact pattern is derived from Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir.
1996).
396. Macey et al., supra note 261, at 1041.
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significance level such that the probability of a Type 1 error is less than 5%;
this is a standard level used by researchers in finance and economics."m
The Type I error with which they are concerned is that of finding an
effect on the market when the abnormal return was in fact the result of
random chance.398 Their proposal, however, completely disregards the
probability of a Type II error, finding no effect on the market when the
misleading statement actually caused harm.399  As we have seen, the .05
level leads to a decision-making regime in which the probability of an
incorrect exoneration far exceeds the probability of an incorrect
condemnation.400
If we utilized the traditional confidence level of ninety-five percent, the
statistician would conclude that the statistics were "not significant" and thus
not proof that the misleading information affected the market. But what if a
different confidence level had been selected, such as eighty percent?401
Now, the statistics would be found to be "significant" and proof that the
market was affected.
The usual response to a suggestion of an eighty percent significance
level is that it would permit too high a rate of error. That concern, of course,
only refers to the Type I error of finding an effect on the market when the
abnormal return was really the result of random chance. But if our concern
is with avoiding too high a rate of Type II error, the ninety-five percent
significance level is also suspect. In fact, there is an arbitrariness to
choosing any magic number for a significance level, especially when we are
concerned with both types of errors.
The ideal solution would be to use a significance test that had the effect
of equalizing both Type I and Type II errors. Such an approach would
reflect the assumption implicit in the preponderance of the evidence standard
for civil trials in general, that Type I and Type II errors impose "essentially
equal costs" on society.402 It would also "equalize the cost of 'wrong'
397. Id. The authors do add that "there is no correct significance level, and calibrating the
tradeoff is ultimately a value judgment based on the costs of incorrectly rejecting the null
hypothesis." Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
401. See Farrell, supra note 323, at 2211. Professor Farrell proposes that, for normative reasons,
where the purpose of a legal decision is to award compensation for personal loss, the law should
adopt a lower degree of certainty, perhaps an 80% standard of statistical significance, and thus
display greater tolerance for false positives. See id.
402. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role, supra note 238, at 950; see also Posner, supra note 7, at 1504
("In the typical civil trial, there is no basis for supposing that Type I errors (false positives, such as
convicting an innocent person) on average impose higher costs than Type II errors (false negatives,
such as an erroneous acquittal).").
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judgments so that the system as a whole would favor neither plaintiffs nor
defendants."403
One mathematical problem with implementing such a solution is that
Type II errors are often not able to be calculated.404 To understand why,
consider this story of a challenge to a grand jury pool.405 In a community
where thirty-eight percent of African-Americans were eligible to serve,
eighteen persons were selected by local jury commissioners to serve on the
grand jury; three of those selected were African-Americans (seventeen
percent) and the other fifteen were white. The question is whether the
disparity between the expected percentage and the actual percentage was the
result of random chance or a discriminatory selection process.
With the usual null hypothesis of random chance, the P-value for this
situation is .051, which would not be "statistically significant" at the
traditional .05 level. That .05 level, remember, represents a five percent risk
of the Type I error of incorrectly condemning the innocent.
Calculating the risk of the Type II error of incorrectly exonerating
discriminatory jury commissioners is impossible, because we do not know
how discriminatory they were. As one commentator noted, "there are many
possible degrees of inequality or disadvantage." 06 The commissioners
could be enthusiastic bigots, trying to prevent every black from serving, or
they could be subtler bigots, just tilting the playing field slightly.
Intuitively, it is easier to mistakenly overlook the discriminator who only
marginally affects the selection process as opposed to the one whose results
are far more blatant.
Statisticians capture that variability with what is known as the "power
function." 07  The power function represents the differing probabilities of
rejecting the null hypothesis of "no effect" for the full range of possible
actual effects. In the grand jury case, for example, the power function would
403. Cohen, Confidence in Probability, supra note 284, at 417; see also Dawson, supra note 315,
at 209.
404. See FORTHOFER, supra note 306, at 218.
405. This story is derived from Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, supra note
238, at 1338-60. Professor Kaye's example was modeled after Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078,
1082 (4th Cir. 1982).
406. See Goldstein, supra note 311, at 35. As Dr. Goldstein notes:
[T]he true rate at which one group is being hired may be six percent higher than another
(a simple alternative hypothesis), or it may be four percent higher (another simple
alternative), or five, or seven, or eight percent higher, and so on. The vaguer alternative
hypothesis of some degree of difference or disadvantage is a composite of such simple,
well-specified, hypotheses.
Id at 35-36.
407. Kaye, Is Proofof Statistical Significance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1357.
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reveal that use of the ninety-five percent confidence level will very rarely
identify a small discriminatory effect. The test has a somewhat improved
chance of identifying larger discriminatory effects but still "does not have a
better than even chance of correctly detecting [discrimination]-unless the
list is so grossly biased . . . that a black's chance of appearing on a grand
jury is diluted by some sixty percent" from what it would be absent any
discrimination.408
It is obvious in the grand jury example that use of the ninety-five
percent significance level will create a high risk of overlooking
discriminatory conduct. We cannot simply say "equalize" Type I and Type
II errors, however, because there are multiple probabilities for different Type
II errors.
One way to fulfill the spirit of equalizing Type I and Type II errors is to
borrow from the concept known as "baseball" or "final offer" arbitration.409
In baseball arbitration, two parties each submit an amount meant to represent
a fair resolution of a dispute and the arbitrator must choose between those
two. Thus, in a salary dispute, the team owner and player each select a
proposed salary and the arbitrator must select one or the other as the "fairer"
figure.
For hypothesis testing, each side could propose their own hypothesis.
Thus, the jury commissioners charged with discrimination would provide the
null hypothesis; they would then contend that their conduct had "no effect"
on the actual numbers that appeared. Those challenging the commissioners
would need to select some level of discrimination they contend occurred as
the alternate hypothesis. From those two possibilities, it is easy to create a
significance level that equalizes Type I and Type II errors. If the regression
analysis revealed a higher probability of seeing an abnormal return than that
significance level, the statistics would not disprove the defendant's
hypothesis that its statements did not affect the market. If however, the
analysis revealed a smaller probability of seeing that abnormal return, the
plaintiffs alternate hypothesis with the specified level of discrimination
would be accepted.410
The "baseball arbitration" approach would be particularly valuable in
cases such as the securities fraud example discussed earlier. 41 1 A
408. Id. at 1359.
409. Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes,
88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 365-66 (2003).
410. Even ifa judge were reluctant to alter the usual .05 significance level, such an equalization of
risks would be appropriate if there was some other evidence of discriminatory actions by the jury
commissioners. For example, as the court in the case on which this example was drawn stated,
"[a]dditional evidence that could have supported the petitioner's case would include statistics
showing that the jury commissioners exempted a disproportionate number of blacks during their
proceedings." Moultrie, 690 F.2d at 1085.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 383-89 (discussing an example of securities fraud).
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corporation that had deliberately released misleading information, that is, a
proven wrongdoer, would contend for its null hypothesis that its statements
had no effect on stock prices.412 For their alternate hypothesis, plaintiff
shareholders would then select some level of price increase that they would
claim was caused by the misleading statements for their alternate hypothesis.
Again, from those two hypotheses, a significance level could be selected to
balance the risk of mistakenly finding an effect from a harmless statement
and erroneously excusing the company whose fraud affected the market.
Note that the smaller the alleged effect, the lower the equalizing significance
level will need to be, making it easier for the plaintiff to prove an effect. Of
course, the smaller the alleged effect, the lower the plaintiffs damages will
be. To prevent the manipulation of statistics with de minimis alleged effects,
courts could require that any effect be of "practical or substantive
significance."41
Equalizing Type I and Type II errors would do more than simply
balance the risks of error. It would also reflect a policy judgment that the
harm from the risk of error to an innocent investor is deemed as important as
the harm of the risk of error to a proven wrongdoer.
Sometimes, however, the nature of the statistical analysis being used
makes it difficult to create a power function, and thus impossible to equalize
the risk of error.414 Additionally, there may be judges who understand the
necessity of improving the balance between Type I and Type II errors but
still feel wedded to the ninety-five percent confidence level. For both
situations, there is another approach: When dealing with a proven
wrongdoer, courts should utilize the "one-tailed" rather than the more
traditional "two-tailed" analysis. 415
To understand the distinction, recall that hypothesis testing determines
the probability of obtaining a result as "extreme" as the one actually seen if
the null hypothesis of "no effect" were correct. 1 In Heads You Win, the
two-tailed test revealed how likely it was for Charles to toss sixty or more
412. There might be strategic reasons for the company to select some small level of price increase,
for example, if the use of that small increase creates a better chance of the null hypothesis not being
disproved.
413. Goldstein, supra note 311, at 38 n.13.
414. See, e.g., id. at 36 n.10 ("For some forms of statistical analysis, the calculation of power is
very complicated and/or involves a noncentrality parameter (measure of the extent of difference in
the populations) that has no obvious or intuitive interpretation.").
415. Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259, 323 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
416. See supra text accompanying notes 281-83.
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heads or sixty or more tails. A one-tailed test would focus on the narrower
question of how likely it was for him to toss sixty or more heads.
On a strictly numerical basis, with a one-tailed test it is usually easier to
find statistical significance. A one-tailed test with a significant value of
ninety-five percent is generally equivalent to a two-tailed test with a
significant value of ninety percent. 417 That would mean that Type I errors
would be twice as likely, and Type II errors would be less likely (though by
an uncertain amount).4 18 Thus, Type I and Type II errors would be more
nearly in balance; there is a greater chance of condemning the innocent and a
lower risk of exonerating the culpable.419
In the case of a proven wrongdoer, this improved balance is important.
Some courts, however, have rejected one-tailed tests precisely because they
make it easier for plaintiffs to show a statistical significance.420 One court in
an employment discrimination case explained its preference for the two-
tailed test on the grounds that a one-tailed test only indicates whether blacks
are treated worse than whites while a two-tailed test "demonstrates whether
blacks and whites were treated equally, taking into account both whether
whites are treated as well as or better than blacks and vice versa.'A21
That argument only makes sense, though, if there is reason to believe
that the discrimination could have gone in either direction. If there is other
evidence of anti-black bias by an employer, it would be naive at best to
pretend that whites are as likely to be harmed as African-Americans. For
example, the Supreme Court has stated that where a school board acted with
a discriminatory motive, there is a high probability that "similar
impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in other areas of
the system.'A22 With evidence of discriminatory intent, a one-tailed test is a
far more accurate tool for assessing how likely the "extreme" result was to
417. The practical difference between one-tailed tests and two-tailed tests "is that the P-value
produced by a two-tailed test is usually twice as great as that produced by a one-tailed test."
Slender, 803 F. Supp. at 323, 323.
418. As Dr. Richard Goldstein wrote, "[a] one-tailed test is more powerful." Goldstein, supra
note 311, at 47.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37. While we know that the probability of a Type II
error will decrease with a one-tailed analysis, it is impossible to say by how much. See supra notes
232-33 and accompanying text. Also, even after the decrease, there still would likely be a larger
probability of a Type II error than a Type I error.
420. See Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "a two-tailed test and a
5% probability of randomness require statistical evidence measuring 1.96 standard deviations.
Consequently, if plaintiffs come into court relying only on evidence that the underselection of
women for a particular job measured 1.75 standard deviations, it seems improper for a court to
establish an inference of disparate treatment on the basis of this evidence alone.").
421. Moore v. Summers, 113 F. Supp. 2d 5, 20 n.2 (D.D.C. 2000).
422. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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occur: "One-tailed tests are most appropriate when one population is
consistently overselected over another." 23
Courts should be able to act on the reasonable presumption that the
proven wrongdoer who attempted to create an effect in one direction did not
create an effect in the opposite direction. Thus, if Charles filed the coin in
order to increase the number of heads he tossed, we should not assume he
was equally as likely to increase the numbers of tails he tossed. Similarly, in
the case of the securities fraud, if we determine that the deliberately
misleading statements were made in an attempt to raise stock prices, it
would be perfectly reasonable to assume they did not lower prices.
Although conceivable, it is highly unlikely that a truly incompetent
wrongdoer was completely counterproductive. When courts use a two-tailed
test, they are essentially giving an unjust benefit of the doubt to the party
who was actively committing wrongful acts.424 Use of the two-tailed test in
such a situation "would certainly make a wrongdoer a favorite of the law at
the expense of an innocent sufferer.'" 25 In the name of justice, as well as
probability, courts should be willing to analyze cases of a proven wrongdoer
by use of a one-tailed test.
VI. CONCLUSION
More than forty years ago, the California Supreme Court admonished:
"Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, while
assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not cast a spell over
him."426 It turns out that mathematics is not merely a sorcerer but a bully as
well, seizing the power to make policy judgments that belong to the courts.
In the misguided name of mathematical rigor, courts have allowed "race
talk" to enter into our criminal trials, and prejudice to reduce tort awards.
With judicial acquiescence, information universally acknowledged to be
incorrect and baseless has been used to calculate the probabilities of
paternity. Moreover, known wrongdoers have been permitted to escape
liability because judges have abdicated their responsibility of balancing the
423. Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259, 323 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also United States v.
Delaware, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4560, at *36 n.27 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2004) (stating that for a one-
tailed test to be appropriate, "one must assume ... that there will only be one type of relationship
between the variables").
424. Kingston v. Chicago & Nw. R.R. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927).
425. Id. at 915.
426. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
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risks of error that are an inevitable part of any trial. Outside the realm of
mathematics, judges would never accept such policies.
It is not necessary for judges to become "amateur mathematicians" in
order to reclaim their rightful role.427 However, they must be aware that the
apparent objectivity of mathematics often masks subjective judgments, and
not be fooled when "hard" numbers are really based on little more than
intuition and guesswork.428 Numbers can communicate important
information. Judges just need to make sure that they are able to comprehend
what those numbers are trying to say.
427. In Daubert, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that a requirement that judges evaluate
"scientific validity," imposes on them the obligation, "to become amateur scientists." Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
428. Kaye, Is Proof ofStatistical Significance Relevant?, supra note 238, at 1347.
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